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This Article examines the conflict between state law which permits
the creation of security interests in a debtor's after-acquired
property-or "floating liens"--and federal bankruptcy law's
potential cutoff of many of those security interests. This conflict
arises in virtually every bankruptcy case. However, because of
ambiguous statutory language and a failure of the jurisprudence
to balance competing policies, the case law is ad hoc and lacks a
conceptual center. This Article argues that using a model of a
debtor in liquidation to analyze the cutoff of floating liens would
balance the underlying policy considerations and make judicial
outcomes more predictable.
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INTRODUCTION
Financiers that lend money on a secured basis often require the
borrower, or debtor, to secure the loan not only by existing collateral
but also by a security interest in the debtor's future assets.' State
commercial law governing secured transactions has long recognized
and enforced these so-called "floating liens.",
2
1. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 6-68, at 407 (1993). "Especially
in business bankruptcies, the typical debtor's property is encumbered by U.C.C. Article 9
security interests that float over the debtor's estate and attach automatically to property
of the kinds described in the parties' security agreement whenever the debtor acquires
such property." Id.
2. See U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (1995). This Article uses the term "floating lien" in a
broad sense to cover any security interest in post-petition collateral. That interest could
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If, however, the debtor subsequently becomes the subject of a
federal bankruptcy case,3 bankruptcy law may cut off the floating
lien.' The cutoff is intended to free up otherwise encumbered assets
that the debtor now can use in its reorganization. Unfortunately, case
law interpretations of the interplay between the state law floating lien
and the bankruptcy cutoff are conflicting, creating troubling ineffi-
ciencies in the credit economy. Major commercial and financial
transactions are often stymied because even sophisticated parties
cannot always know their rights.5
The confusion in the case law stems from ambiguous statutory
language as well as from a fundamental failure of the jurisprudence
in this area to resolve an underlying conceptual dilemma: how to
balance the rights of secured creditors with the policy of rehabilitat-
ing a debtor in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law cuts off a floating lien on
a debtor's post-petition assets except to the extent the lien covers
"proceeds, product, offspring, or profits" of pre-petition collateral.6
arise either pursuant to a floating lien under U.C.C. § 9-204 or, for example, where the
post-petition collateral constitutes proceeds of pre-petition collateral under U.C.C. § 9-
306(2). Because this Article addresses the tension between post-petition collateral and
bankruptcy policies, the technicalities by which the post-petition collateral is created are
irrelevant.
3. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994) (the "Code").
4. See id. § 552 (post-petition effect of security interest provision). The bankruptcy
cutoff does not raise constitutional issues. See David Gray Carlson, Post-petition Interest
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 585 (1989) ("There is little doubt
that Congress can adversely affect security interests prospectively, even to the point of
banning them altogether. When Congress acts prospectively, bankruptcy legislation helps
to constitute the very property interest that a secured party might later claim Congress
has taken away."); James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Re-
organization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the
Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 987 (1983) ("What, one may ask [can be]
'taken' from the secured creditor? At the time he entered into the security arrangement,
he knew or should have known that his rights were circumscribed by the federal legisla-
tion.").
5. The author has seen numerous business transactions fail because of uncertainty
over the enforceability of a floating lien on franchise fees, utility surcharges, intellectual
property licenses, management contracts and other future-arising financial assets that
companies increasingly are turning to as a basis for obtaining capital market financing.
See infra text accompanying notes 23-28. Forming expectations is impossible when the
law governing a transaction is unclear. Yet a lender's expectations "are central to the
calculation of interest rates and other types of loans, and fulfilling those expectations is
therefore important to the efficiency of credit markets." Union Say. Bank v. Augie Res-
tivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515,519 (2d Cir. 1988).
6. Section 552(a) of the Code states that "property acquired by the estate or by the
debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any
security agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case."
11 U.S.C. § 552(a). However, subsection (b) provides an exception to this rule:
(b)(1) Except as provided in sections 363,506(c), 522, 544, 545, 547, and 548 of
this title, if the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement before the
1997]
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However, there is no agreement on what these terms mean. For ex-
ample, if a floating lien covers all of a debtor's existing and future
assets, would it extend to the debtor's future assets in bankruptcy be-
cause those assets all derive from and therefore are proceeds,
product, offspring, or profits of the debtor's pre-petition estate? But
if it did extend to all such future assets, would the bankruptcy cutoff
be meaningful? Also, is milk the "product" of a cow? The cases are
split evenly,7 causing one judge to observe that "learned folk ...
throw up their hands in 'udder' frustration .... " The confusion in-
creases because bankruptcy law allows a court, "based on the equities
of the case,"9 to cut off a floating lien even on proceeds, product, off-
spring, or profits of pre-petition collateral.
This issue of how to balance state law floating liens with federal
bankruptcy law's cutoff of post-petition security arises in every bank-
ruptcy of a company that has granted such a security interest. Courts
have given some thought to the balance, but the resulting jurispru-
dence is still, at best, ad hoc."0 To illustrate the problem, consider the
commencement of the case and if the security interest created by such security
agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the commence-
ment of the case and to proceeds, product, offspring, or profits of such property,
then such security interest extends to such proceeds, product, offspring, or prof-
its acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the extent
provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law, ex-
cept to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the
equities of the case, orders otherwise.
(2) Except as provided in sections 363,506(c), 522,544,545,547, and 548 of this
title, and notwithstanding section 546(b) of this title, if the debtor and an entity
entered into a security agreement before the commencement of the case and if
the security interest created by such security agreement extends to property of
the debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and to amounts paid
as rents of such property or the fees, charges, accounts, or other payments for
the use or occupancy of rooms and other public facilities in hotels, motels, or
other lodging properties, then such security interest extends to such rents and
such fees, charges, accounts, or other payments acquired by the estate after the
commencement of the case to the extent provided in such security agreement,
except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the
equities of the case, orders otherwise.
Id. § 552(b).
7. See In re Delbridge, 61 B.R. 484, 486 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (discussing why
"half the courts dealing with this logically preposterous proposition have adopted [the
view that milk is not the product of a cow]"), affid on other grounds, 104 B.R. 824 (E.D.
Mich. 1989).
8. Id.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also infra notes 249-85 and accompanying text (discussing
the equities exception).
10. The jurisprudence is so confusing that Congress, at the behest of hotel industry
financiers, attempted to clarify § 552 by amending it and adding subsection (b)(2). See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 214, 108 Stat. 4106, 4126. How-
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plight of BioTech, a hypothetical pharmaceutical manufacturer, and
its creditors.1' BioTech borrows money from Spendthrift Bank &
Trust to begin developing a drug that would block the spread of ma-
lignant cancer cells. In return, Spendthrift negotiates for and is
granted a security interest in BioTech's then existing and future aris-
ing inventory. The project becomes more expensive than expected,
so BioTech subsequently borrows additional funds from Mover,
Shaker & Associates and gives as collateral a security interest in
some publicly traded shares of stock that BioTech owns, as well as in
its right to receive payments under a contract to supply Gargantuan
Research Institute with patented cell lines.12
A year later, with project costs mounting and the drug no closer
to realization, BioTech finds it can no longer afford to pay its credi-
tors on a timely basis. After efforts to renegotiate its debts fail,
BioTech files a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Code so
that it can delay payment to its creditors and attempt to reorganize.
3
After the filing, BioTech seeks permission from the bankruptcy
court to use the cash proceeds of the sale of pre-petition inventory to
purchase new inventory and therefore continue in business. 4 Spend-
thrift counters that its security interest not only covers such proceeds
ever, this amendment specifically addresses the application of § 552 to hotel revenues and
will not provide a coherent policy for interpreting the provision as a whole. See infra
notes 224-29 and accompanying text (discussing § 552(b) exception for security interests
in hotel revenues).
11. The Biotech hypothetical was inspired by case law precedents. See, e.g., In re
Lawrence, 41 B.R. 36,38 (Bankr. D. Minn.) (holding that post-petition milk production is
beyond the reach of a floating lien on farm products), affd, 56 B.R. 727 (D. Minn. 1984).
12. Contract rights may be risky assets to take as collateral. Under § 365 of the
Code, a trustee may reject executory contracts that are not advantageous to the bank-
ruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (executory contract provision); see also DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 114-41 (rev. ed. 1993) (discussing the operation
of § 365). In this hypothetical, we assume a supply contract that is advantageous to Bio-
Tech.
13. When a company files a bankruptcy petition, a creditor's right to foreclose on
collateral or collect debts is automatically suspended. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (automatic
stay provisions).
14. BioTech's argument would be based on 11 U.S.C. § 552(b), stating that a court,
"based on the equities of the case," may terminate a floating lien on proceeds of pre-
petition collateral. See infra notes 249-85 and accompanying text; see also In re Lawrence,
41 B.R. at 38 ("Even if the Court had determined that the post-petition milk was subject
to the Bank's security interest under § 552(b), the Court would reach the same end result.
Section 552(b)'s exception has a proviso giving the Court power to terminate a security
interest despite the protection otherwise provided by 552(b) based on balancing the equi-
ties of the case."). BioTech also could have moved under 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) to use the
cash proceeds to purchase new inventory so long as Spendthrift received "adequate pro-
tection," such as a lien on the new inventory. See infra notes 100-35 and accompanying
text for a discussion of adequate protection.
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but also extends to all newly arising inventory purchased with such
proceeds. 5 BioTech also seeks the court's permission to finance its
reorganization with the dividends payable on the stock 6 and with the
payments to become due under its supply contract with Gargantuan.
17
But Mover maintains that those payments are subject to its security
interest.'"
In considering these motions, the bankruptcy court struggled
with the competing policies of rehabilitating debtors and preserving
creditors' expectations. BioTech argued that the court should invoke
the fresh start principle19 underlying the Code and give it the pro-
ceeds and payments to facilitate its reorganization." On the other
hand, Spendthrift and Mover argued that they advanced money to
BioTech because they expected the courts to enforce their contrac-
tual rights to be repaid from the bargained-for collateral.
Faced with an ambiguous statute and the absence of clear case
law guidance, and in order to promote BioTech's reorganization, the
bankruptcy court invalidated Mover's security interest in both the
dividends and the future contractual payments;2 it also invalidated
Spendthrift's security interest in the portion of the inventory's sale
15. Spendthrift's argument would be based on U.C.C. § 9-306(1) and In re Bumper
Sales, Inc., 907 F.2d 1430 (4th Cir. 1990), discussed infra in notes 182-92 and accompany-
ing text.
16. See infra notes 160-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of floating liens on
stock dividends.
17. See infra notes 198-219 and accompanying text for a discussion of floating liens
on contracts.
18. And therefore that BioTech, as debtor-in-possession, must obtain the court's
permission and provide adequate protection in order to use such payments because they
constitute cash collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2), (e).
19. The fresh start principle is that honest, but unfortunate, debtors should have the
opportunity to reorganize and begin anew. This policy "underl[ies] the entire Bankruptcy
Code." In re Lawrence, 41 B.R. at 37. For a more detailed discussion of the fresh start
concept, see infra notes 93-151 and accompanying text.
20. BioTech then would not have to provide adequate protection with respect to
post-petition inventory. See supra note 14.
21. F.D.I.C. v. Hastie (In re Hastie), 2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993), discussed infra in
notes 160-72 and accompanying text, has been interpreted by some to allow the cutoff of a
lien on stock dividends. A dictum in United Virginia Bank v. Slab Fork Coal Co., 784 F.2d
1188 (4th Cir. 1986), leaves open the possibility that the Code allows courts to refuse to
recognize an otherwise valid security interest in post-petition proceeds of pre-petition
collateral on the grounds that invalidating the security interest would promote the
debtor's fresh start. See id. at 1191; accord In re Vanas, 50 B.R. 988, 997 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1985); In re Serbus, 48 B.R. 5,8 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Lawrence, 41 B.R. at
38. But see J. Catton Farms, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 779 F.2d 1242, 1246-47
(7th Cir. 1985); Wolters Village, Ltd. v. Village Properties, Ltd. (In re Village Properties,
Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441,444 (5th Cir. 1984); infra notes 249-85 and accompanying text.
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proceeds that represents BioTech's profit. Spendthrift and Mover
are outraged. They both plan to demand higher interest rates from
the next risky company, like BioTech, that seeks financing from
them." Perhaps they will withhold financing altogether.
The problem becomes even more critical from the standpoint of
parties trying to plan commercial and financial transactions that rely
on future cash flows from financial assets.2 An entire industry that,
according to the Securities and Exchange Commission, is "becoming
one of the dominant means of capital formation in the United
States"2 -- asset securitization-depends on these cash flows.' A
company originating financial assets sells them to a newly created
special purpose vehicle ("SPV") that, in turn, funds the purchase of
the financial assets by issuing securities in the capital markets.'
Those securities must be rated at an acceptable level by independent
rating agencies or else investors will not buy them.' The rating agen-
cies, however, use a methodology that assumes the worst case-a
bankruptcy of the company and repayment coming solely from the
financial assets-in assessing the riskiness of the rating given to the
SPV's securities. Accordingly, the ambiguity of § 552 can raise pro-
found concerns in asset securitization deals that depend, as they
increasingly do, on future-arising financial assets.2
This ambiguity reflects a failure of the law to distinguish two
fundamental, and fundamentally different, ways in which post-
22. That does not mean that the company will agree to pay a higher interest rate.
Other lenders, not yet so outraged, may be prepared to lend at the original rate until the
loan market adjusts to the risk. Of course, interest rates do not necessarily go up every
time a secured lender suffers a loss in a bankruptcy case. A lender might conclude that
the chance of the debtor going bankrupt is so remote and the potential impact of § 552 so
ambiguous as to justify ignoring the issue. The more likely impact, therefore, is on busi-
ness transactions that depend on after-acquired property for repayment. See supra note 5
and infra text accompanying notes 23-28.
23. Financial assets are assets that represent rights to payments at future dates, such
as intellectual property licenses and management contracts. See supra note 5.
24. Investment Company Act Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992) (provided in connection with the issuance
of Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940).
25. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L. Bus.
& FIN. 133, 135 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Alchemy].
26. See id. at 135-36.
27. See id. at 136.
28. See infra notes 236-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application
of § 552 to "true sales" in asset securitization transactions. Many asset securitization
deals are structured as secured transactions and not true sales, see Schwarcz, Alchemy,
supra note 25, at 140 n.26, in which case § 552 would be directly applicable to the bank-
ruptcy analysis.
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petition collateral can arise. First, an asset subject to a pre-petition
security interest can change form, such as happened to the inventory
which, when sold, changed form to receivables and ultimately to
money. This Article will introduce the term "liquidating collateral"29
to describe this type of asset, and will refer to assets that replace or
substitute for liquidating collateral' as "replacement collateral."
Under both existing law3' and intuitive reasoning, replacement collat-
eral should be subject to the floating lien.
A fundamentally different way in which post-petition collateral
can arise is where after-acquired assets do not replace liquidating
collateral. If these assets also are subject to a lien under non-
bankruptcy law, this Article will refer to such assets as "non-
replacement" collateral. An example of non-replacement collateral
would be the dividends payable on the publicly traded stock.'
It is not at all intuitive that bankruptcy law should allow a float-
ing lien to attach to non-replacement collateral. Under existing law,
that issue would be analyzed by asking whether the non-replacement
collateral constitutes "proceeds, product, offspring, or profits" of pre-
petition collateral; but such a causation test does not effectively ad-
dress the tension between bankruptcy and commercial law." On the
29. See infra text accompanying note 81.
30. To the extent such assets also are subject to a lien under non-bankruptcy law.
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994).
32. See infra notes 160-79 and accompanying text. Another example of non-
replacement collateral would be a factory constructed by a debtor operating in Chapter
11, assuming, of course, that the factory is subject to the pre-petition lien and the debtor
does not use cash collateral to construct it.
33. Existing bankruptcy law generally cuts off floating liens on post-petition assets,
subject to the exceptions listed above. Professor David Gray Carlson suggests a technical
analogy to rationalize this cutoff. Suppose A owns inventory (I,) and conveys a security
interest in I, to SP. A then sells I, to B in a bulk sale. SP's security interest would con-
tinue in I, because a bulk sale is not a purchase in the ordinary course of business. See
U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9), 9-306(2), 9-307(1) (1995). B subsequently buys more inventory (12).
Does SP have an after-acquired property security interest in I,?
The answer depends on whether the funds used to buy I, were proceeds of 1. If they
were, then SP's security interest would continue in 12. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2). If they were
not, then SP's security interest would not continue in I, because I, does not derive from I,
and B never signed a security agreement with SP. SP's after-acquired property rights
arise from the contract between A and SP. Unless B expressly promises to assume this
security agreement, I2 is unencumbered. See David Gray Carlson, Bulk Sales Under Arti-
cle 9: Some Easy Cases Made Difficult, 41 ALA. L. REV. 729,763-91 (1990).
This case can be analogized to bankruptcy. The pre-petition debtor is A-admittedly
bound by the security agreement with SP. The bankruptcy trustee is B. The trustee is not
bound on the security agreement because the trustee is not the same entity as A. This is
equally true in Chapter 11 where the trustee is also the debtor-in-possession. The debtor-
in-possession has a separate capacity when serving as bankruptcy trustee, and therefore is
[Vol. 75
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one hand, the more assets a pre-petition lien is allowed to encumber,
the less likely it will be that the debtor can successfully reorganize in
bankruptcy. Floating liens should not, for example, be permitted to
deprive a debtor of its profit incentive to operate a business in Chap-
ter 11. On the other hand, a secured creditor should be entitled to
the benefit of its contractual bargain where debtor rehabilitation is
not impeded. Permitting a floating lien always to attach to non-
replacement collateral would discourage rehabilitation. But always
cutting off a floating lien in non-replacement collateral would deprive
a secured creditor of its contractual bargain even where the lien
would not impede the debtor's ability to reorganize. The answer
therefore lies in the balance.
To reach that balance, this Article proposes a model that distin-
guishes the treatment of replacement and non-replacement collateral
in a way that harmonizes a debtor's right to a fresh start with a se-
cured creditor's contractual bargain: Creditors that are secured by
after-acquired property should receive in bankruptcy, on account of
their floating lien, what they would receive if their lien continued but
the debtor were liquidated. This result would obtain irrespective of
whether the debtor actually liquidates or reorganizes. It effectively
limits the security interest in after-acquired collateral to assets that
would become part of the debtor's estate in a liquidation.
Part I of this Article describes the current treatment of replace-
ment and non-replacement collateral under state and federal law, and
explains how the proposed liquidation model is designed to strike a
balance between them.34 Part II evaluates the liquidation model,
not bound (except to the extent of liens that have vested pre-petition) on the pre-petition
security agreement. Accordingly, SP's security interest would only continue in post-
petition collateral that derived from pre-petition collateral.
This analogy may not, however, provide a complete explanation of the cutoff of
floating liens. While it fixes a balance between secured creditor claims and the debtor's
right to a fresh start in bankruptcy, it does not fully explore the consequences of that bal-
ance. Of course, one may argue that secured creditors should expect exactly what the law
tells them they can expect. This Article, however, argues that in rethinking the law an
approach based on balancing the competing commercial law and bankruptcy policies will
yield the most meaningful result.
34. See infra notes 48-92 and accompanying text. Some may ask whether there is a
less intrusive way than the liquidation model to harmonize state commercial law with
federal bankruptcy law. One approach, for example, might be to simply clarify the defini-
tion of "proceeds, product, offspring, or profits" under 11 U.S.C. § 552(a). However, as
shown in Part III.B.5 (describing that a recent "clarification" of § 552's application to
hotel revenues has left possible ambiguities and inconsistencies), one cannot even attempt
to clarify these terms without resolving the more fundamental question of what post-
petition collateral should be subject to pre-petition lien. The liquidation model is an at-
tempt to resolve that underlying question.
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showing that it is fair both to creditors and debtors and is consistent
with commercial law and bankruptcy policies.35 Part III illustrates
how the liquidation model would be applied, and also compares the
model with existing bankruptcy law approaches and demonstrates
that it would further systematize the jurisprudence. 6 Annex A to this
Article proposes statutory language to help implement the liquida-
tion model.37 Annex B illustrates differences in outcomes under
existing law and under the liquidation model." Finally, Annex C re-
fers the reader to portions of the Article that explain significant
concepts.39
Several points must be clarified at the outset. First, the liquida-
tion model only addresses whether property acquired by the debtor
after the date of the bankruptcy will be subject to a floating lien.
Bankruptcy policy does not purport to affect a security interest in
property existing prior to that date. A secured party therefore would
be entitled, as under current law, to any appreciation in the market
value of the pre-petition collateral, and cannot under the liquidation
model be "cashed out" by a low valuation.'" The model thus recog-
nizes a distinction between the appreciating value of existing
collateral in which a lien has already attached under state law prior to
bankruptcy, and the separate issue (on which the model focuses) of
whether bankruptcy should respect a secured party's lien that at-
taches to assets first created after the debtor's bankruptcy.
Collateral also can depreciate.4' To understand the relation be-
tween depreciation and the liquidation model, one must keep a
number of concepts separate. First, the liquidation model should not
35. See infra notes 93-152 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 153-285 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Annex A.
38. See infra Annex B.
39. See infra Annex C
40. See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (holding that a lien on real
property continues in bankruptcy so that "[a]ny increase over the judicially determined
valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the creditor, not to the bene-
fit of the debtor"); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1994) (giving the secured creditor the option,
in a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Code, not to be "cashed out" for the ap-
praised value of the collateral, and therefore to realize its eventual market value); id.
§ 1129(b) (stating that a bankruptcy court may not "cram down" a plan of reorganization
over the dissent of an objecting class of secured creditors unless the plan pays at least the
value of the collateral).
41. By depreciation, we mean the "wearing out of plant and capital goods, such as
machines and equipment." JOHN DOvNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY
OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 135 (4th ed. 1995).
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be confused with a secured creditor's right to adequate protection 2
for depreciating collateral. That right already exists under law.43 In
contrast, the liquidation model is not intended to create rights,
rather, it helps to determine how bankruptcy should limit a security
interest created under non-bankruptcy law.'
Second, the application of the "replace or substitute" standard of
the liquidation model to depreciating collateral might be confusing
because depreciation sometimes clearly results in replacement collat-
eral, but often does not. The model would run into intractable
problems of measuring causation unless it sets a threshold standard
for determining when depreciating assets are deemed to be replaced
by other assets. This Article therefore will treat collateral that re-
duces in value solely by reason of depreciation as non-liquidating
collateral unless the collateral generates assets whose value plainly
correlates to the reduction in value. Milk of a cow or widgets pro-
duced by a machine are examples of assets whose value does not
plainly correlate to the reduction in value of the underlying collat-
eral. A cow and a machine each declines in value by reason of
depreciation because both have finite useful lives. Yet each should
be treated under the model as non-liquidating collateral because the
milk produced by a cow and the widgets produced by a machine
during a given period do not plainly correlate to the reduction in
value of the cow or the machine during that period-indeed, the cow
or the machine may be worth more or less at the end of the period
depending on the then applicable market value of cows or used ma-
chines, irrespective of the milk or widgets actually produced during
such period.
Treating depreciating collateral under the model as non-
liquidating does not prejudice the secured party because secured
creditors already have a right under existing law to adequate protec-
tion for depreciating collateral.4 For example, say a secured creditor
42. For an explanation of adequate protection, see infra note 112 and accompanying
text.
43. A secured creditor is entitled to "adequate protection" under 11 U.S.C. § 361 for
depreciating collateral during the period of the bankruptcy stay's prevention of the credi-
tor's foreclosing on the collateral.
44. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 47-58.
45. We recognize this solution is a practical compromise and not entirely consistent,
for example, with this Article's treatment of a lease as replacement collateral for the un-
derlying leased property. See infra text accompanying notes 194-97. One could have
argued that the secured creditor should be limited to adequate protection for the debtor's
leasing of collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994). Nonetheless, a distinction can be made
between depreciation and leasing. Depreciation is widespread and not entirely within the
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has a pre-petition lien on a machine used by a debtor to produce wid-
gets and on the widgets themselves. If the machine depreciates in the
debtor's bankruptcy, the secured creditor would be entitled to ade-
quate protection under existing law. Thus, there would be no need to
determine under the liquidation model whether the widgets consti-
tute replacement collateral for the machine.
The model also does not-nor does it need to-address the right
of the holder of a floating lien to be protected on a present value ba-
sis through post-petition interest." The job of the model is rather to
determine which portions of a bankrupt debtor's after-acquired
property should be subject to a floating lien. Once that determina-
tion is made, other rules of bankruptcy that have nothing to do with
floating liens and that are based on independent policy considera-
tions will govern whether or not post-petition interest accrues.
47
Furthermore, the liquidation model does not purport to em-
power a secured creditor with any rights that it does not already have
under non-bankruptcy law. The model instead provides guidance as
to how bankruptcy law should limit those non-bankruptcy rights. The
discussion throughout this Article therefore assumes that the applica-
ble security interest already covers the relevant after-acquired property
under non-bankruptcy law.
Finally, the model is not intended to-and indeed it is doubtful
that any model could---create formulaic certainty. Rather, the goal
of the model is to reduce ambiguity by providing a more intuitive and
perhaps rational way of thinking about the balance between creditor
expectations and debtor rehabilitation.
I. PROPOSED LIQUIDATION MODEL
After explaining the concept of security interests and describing
their treatment in bankruptcy, this Part examines how bankruptcy
courts should recognize security interests in after-acquired property.
debtor's control. Also, the'relationship between a depreciating asset and replacement
assets is tenuous at best. To apply the liquidation model to depreciation therefore would
be burdensome and costly. That existing law already addresses depreciating collateral
makes that application unnecessary. A post-petition lease, on the other hand, is within
the debtor's sole control and is not a typical occurrence. Therefore, applying the liquida-
tion model, which more directly protects a secured creditor than does giving adequate
protection, should not be burdensome or costly.
46. Post-petition interest is interest accruing during the pendency of the bankruptcy
case.
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994) (entitling an oversecured creditor to interest as
provided by pre-petition agreement); United Savs. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 passim (1988).
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A. After-Acquired Collateral Provisions of State Law
Creating a security interest enforceable against third parties is
simple and formalistic.4 Debtors who follow the formal steps out-
lined in the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") demonstrate that
they understand and consent to the creditor's taking a security inter-
est in the collateral. Creditors who satisfy these prerequisites can
expect that a court will recognize the resulting security interest. Ad-
ditionally, by following these prerequisites, creditors notify third
parties of their interest in the collateral so that the third parties can
make financial decisions accordingly.
The creation of a security interest is a two-step process. First,
the security interest must attach so that it is enforceable against the
debtor.49 Attachment occurs when (1) either the debtor and creditor
sign a written security agreement that contains a description of the
collateral or the creditor takes possession of the collateral; (2) the
creditor has given value to the debtor; and (3) the debtor has rights in
the collateral that it can give to the creditor." Second, the creditor
must perfect the security interest in order to make it enforceable
against third parties. Perfection is a means of notifying third parties
of the creditor's claim to the collateral.53 The creditor perfects a se-
curity interest by filing a financing statement in the appropriate
location or, in certain instances, by taking possession of the collateral.
The UCC recognizes two kinds of security interests in af-
ter-acquired property. UCC section 9-204 states that "a security
48. For a general overview of the law governing the creation of a security interest,
see BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1994 & Supp. 1995); ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E.
SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 528-30 (1991); JAMES
J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 22-1 to -20 (3d ed.
1988); see also U.C.C. § 9-201 (1995) ("General Validity of Security Agreement").
49. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (1995). One casebook colorfully explains attachment:
A security interest is a bundle of rights in property-the collateral-which bun-
dle belongs to the secured party. It will sometimes be useful to know when a
secured party obtains his security interest, when his bundle of rights hooks onto,
or attaches to, the collateral.
ROBERT J. NORDSTROM ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SECURED
TRANSACTIONS 113 (1987).
50. The description needs to identify the collateral, but it does not have to be de-
tailed. See U.C.C. § 9-110 (1995); SCHWARTZ & SCOTT, supra note 48, at 528.
51. See U.C.C. § 9-203.
52. See id §§ 9-302 to -306.
53. "Protection of third parties from 'secret' undisclosed liens is a central purpose of
publicizing security interests through perfection. Because the assets available to satisfy
other creditors' claims are diminished, a security interest necessarily increases the risk of
subsequent loans to the debtor." SCHWARTZ & SCOTT, supra note 48, at 529.
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agreement may provide that any or all obligations covered by the se-
curity agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral."54
This type of after-acquired property clause allows creditors to
"[extend] the... security interest to property acquired after an initial
loan as well as to property then owned by the debtor."5  It is
"especially common... with respect to loans on collateral that 'turns
over' such as inventory and accounts."56 The section 9-204 security
interest is "often called a 'floating lien,' for it 'floats' over both ex-
isting and after-acquired property of the debtor."57 The second type
of UCC-created security interest in after-acquired property is the se-
curity interest in proceeds, which are defined in UCC section 9-306 as
"whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or disposi-
tion of collateral or proceeds.""
Security interests in after-acquired property are recognized as
much for pragmatic as for theoretical reasons. 9 Official Comment 2
to UCC section 9-204 explains part of the rationale:
[Section 9-204] rejects the doctrine-of which the judicial
attitude toward after-acquired property interests was one
expression-that there is reason to invalidate as a matter of
law what has been variously called the floating charge, the
free-handed mortgage and the lien on a shifting stock....
The widespread nineteenth-century prejudice against the
floating charge was based on a feeling, often inarticulate in
the opinions, that a commercial borrower should not be al-
lowed to encumber all his assets present and future, and that
for the protection not only of the borrower but of his other
creditors a cushion of free assets should be preserved. That
inarticulate premise has much to recommend it.... Article
[9 of the UCC] decisively rejects it not on the ground that it
54. U.C.C. § 9-204 (1995).
55. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 48, § 23-6, at 1095; accord CLARK, supra note 48,
§ 10-3.
56. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 48, § 23-6, at 1095.
57 Id.
58. U.C.C. § 9-306(1). According to the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code: "[P]roceeds are a species of after-acquired property [and] in many
cases the same result as that arising under [section] 9-306(2) could be achieved ... by
describing the after-acquired property in the security agreement." PERMANENT
EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 106-07 (1992) [hereinafter PEB
REPORT]; see also CLARK, supra note 48, § 10.01[2][a] ("[A]fter-acquired property will
frequently qualify as second generation proceeds, ... as when a dealer sells an appliance
and reinvests the cash proceeds in new inventory.").
59. The remainder of Part L.A was prepared with the able assistance of Nhan Vu, a
1995 graduate of Yale Law School.
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was wrong in policy but on the ground that it was not effec-
tive. In pre-[UCC] law there was a multiplication of
security devices designed to avoid the policy: field ware-
housing, trust receipts, factor's lien acts and so on. The
cushion of free assets was not preserved. In almost every
state it was possible before the [UCC] for the borrower to
give a lien on everything he held or would have.... This Ar-
ticle, in expressly validating the floating charge, merely
recognizes an existing state of things.'
Pragmatism, however, is not the only reason for recognizing
floating liens. If debtors and creditors invented ingenious ways to get
around this common-law prejudice, then compelling economic rea-
sons must support the existence of after-acquired property clauses.
These clauses, for example, can increase financing opportunities by
enabling debtors to borrow greater amounts than their current assets
could support."
Floating liens also can help debtors by reducing their transaction
costs.62 Debtors and creditors do not have to sign new security
agreements and file new financing statements each time debtors
grant a separate and identifiable asset as collateral. This facet of the
floating lien is especially useful when a creditor wishes to secure itself
with changing assets, such as inventory that is constantly being sold
and replaced by similar goods. Without the advantage of a floating
lien, the debtor and creditor would have to go through extensive pa-
perwork with each turnover in collateral.
The focus of this Article, however, is not ultimately on the effi-
ciency or desirability of floating liens under state law. The Article
assumes the continued existence of floating liens under state law63 and
60. U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2.
61. By the same token, the flexibility of allowing after-acquired property clauses
should not hurt sophisticated debtors because companies that do not need the extra fi-
nancing will not grant after-acquired security interests. Our laws no longer presuppose
that a debtor, particularly one that is sophisticated, needs to be protected from its own
business decisions. For a discussion of whether floating liens are fair to unsecured credi-
tors, see infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
62. This reduction is particularly noteworthy because debtors customarily pay for all
of a secured lender's transaction costs as well-as for their own.
63. For a discussion of the efficiency of floating liens under state law, see Steven L.
Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking
Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2063-64 (1994) (arguing that a floating
lien is not inconsistent with the law's general refusal to enforce a debtor's contractual
promise to prefer particular creditors and that there is nothing unfair about permitting a
secured creditor priority when earlier-in-time creditors have not chosen to obtain security
themselves and all creditors have an opportunity to discover the existence of the secured
creditor).
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focuses on how to balance the expectations thereby created with the
federal law policy of debtor rehabilitation.
B. After-Acquired Collateral Under Federal Bankruptcy Law
Predicting when a bankruptcy court will recognize a security in-
terest that does not involve after-acquired property is easy." The
bankruptcy trustee,65 or, absent such appointment, the debtor itself
(which is deemed to have the powers of a bankruptcy trustee), gener-
ally cannot set aside a security interest that was created and perfected
more than ninety days before the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition.
However, the trustee may be able to set aside a security interest if the
creditor has failed to perfect at the time of the bankruptcy' or (in
some cases as a preferential transfer) if the creditor perfects less than
ninety days before bankruptcy."
Predicting when a bankruptcy court will recognize a security in-
terest that does involve after-acquired property, however, is not so
easy. The courts have not yet developed an overarching theory for
evaluating these security interests.s To understand whether a bank-
ruptcy, court should recognize security interests in after-acquired
property, let us consider three hypothetical situations, the first two of
which are variations of our earlier case, Biotech.
First, recall the scenario in which Mover, Shaker & Associates
took a security interest in BioTech's right to receive $2 million under
64. For an overview of the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy, see BAIRD, su-
pra note 12, at 83-113, 165-92.
65. For a description of the role of a bankruptcy trustee, see id. at 8.
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994).
67. See id § 547. If a creditor perfects a security interest less than ninety days before
the debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the trustee may be able to void the security interest
as a preferential transfer. A preferential transfer results when there was a transfer of
property of the debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor on account of an antecedent debt
owed by the debtor before the transfer was made. The transfer must have been made
within ninety days before the petition was filed (unless an insider was involved in the
transaction) and while the debtor was insolvent. The transfer must not enable the credi-
tor to receive more than he would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See id.
§ 547(b).
Granting a security interest is considered a transfer of property. Under the Code,
the transfer is deemed to have been made when the security interest is perfected. See id.
§ 547(e)(2). However, if the creditor perfects a security interest within ten days of its
creation, the Code states that a transfer is made at the time when the interest was created.
See id. Thus, if a creditor perfects a security interest more than ten days after the interest
was created and within the ninety days before bankruptcy, the court may find that a pref-
erential transfer has occurred.
68. For a discussion of current case law evaluating the recognition of after-acquired
property in bankruptcy, see infra notes 153-285 and accompanying text.
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a supply contract with Gargantuan Research Institute. After Bio-
Tech files its bankruptcy petition, Gargantuan sends it a $500,000
check to pay for the first shipment of cell lines.69 Should the court
recognize Mover's security interest in the check? Recognizing
Mover's security interest in the check makes sense. Although the
check is a newly acquired asset of BioTech, it substitutes for a portion
of the contract, whose value has been reduced to $1.5 million. Thus,
the $500,000 check maintains Mover's pre-petition collateral position.
Forcing Mover to forfeit the $500,000 check to BioTech's reorganiza-
tion would impair the benefit of its bargain, which in turn would
adversely affect the credit economy.7 If lenders cannot rely on the
legal system to protect the benefit of their bargains, they will charge
higher interest rates to compensate for their greater risk and may
well deny capital to risky, but worthwhile, ventures.
Second, recall the scenario in which Spendthrift Bank & Trust
took a security interest in BioTech's existing and future inventory.
After BioTech filed a bankruptcy petition, it sold the inventory then
in its possession (valued by Biotech at $1 million) for $1.2 million,
yielding a $200,000 profit. Because the $1.2 million cash proceeds
replaces the pre-petition inventory, Spendthrift would benefit from
the collateral appreciation.' On the other hand, refusing to recog-
nize the floating lien on proceeds would deny Spendthrift the
collateral protection for which it bargained under state law.'
69. This example is "frictionless" in the sense that it assumes BioTech will have no
cost of producing and shipping the cell lines. In the real world, however, BioTech will
have such cost. See infra notes 263-85 and accompanying text for an argument that Bio-
Tech, under §§ 552(b) and 506(c) of the Code, may deduct its cost incurred post-petition
from the amount of each check. If BioTech had no way of recouping this cost, it would
have little incentive in bankruptcy to continue performing the supply contract. By re-
couping this cost, BioTech is motivated to perform the contract in order to realize any
surplus after Mover's debt is paid in full. See U.C.C. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2) (1995).
70. Courts have consistently recognized the importance of predictability to the credit
economy. See supra note 5.
71. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 passim (1992); accord In re Ed Woods Live-
stock, Inc., 172 B.R. 294, 295 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1994) (holding that the secured creditor
was entitled to increased post-petition market value of hay). However, under commercial
law, a secured creditor cannot receive more than repayment of principal and accrued
interest, irrespective of the amount of the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-502(2).
72. Ignoring the Supreme Court's recognition of collateral appreciation and arguing
that Spendthrift is only entitled to the value of its pre-petition collateral would lead to
impractical results. Bankruptcy courts simply cannot conduct valuation hearings for
every item of post-petition collateral. See, for example, FDIC v. Hastie (In re Hastie), 2
F.3d 1042, 1046 (10th Cir. 1993) in which the court stated that: "In our judgment, the
Byzantine factual inquiry that would attend a proceeds rule based upon whether the cash
dividends did or did not diminish the value of the stockholder's equity in the stock would
not be justified in expense or helpfulness ...." I- at 1046; see also infra notes 160-72 and
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Third, consider the situation of Gold Digger Credit Corp., in
which recognizing security interests in after-acquired collateral does
not make sense. Gold Digger makes a $300,000 loan to Jim's Jewelry
Store and secures it with a floating lien on the Store's inventory. The
Store uses the loan to buy trendy plastic rings in exotic shades of
neon. The trend, alas, passes quickly and the Store, unable to sell the
rings, files a petition to reorganize in bankruptcy.
During the reorganization, the Store decides that a more upscale
line of merchandise would salvage the business and obtains a
$150,000 unsecured line of credit from Southwest Bank. The Store
uses the credit to purchase a new inventory of diamond tennis brace-
lets. It also sells the plastic rings to Five & Dime Ltd. for the nominal
amount of $500. Gold Digger's security interest should extend to the
$500 check from Five & Dime but not to the new inventory of tennis
bracelets. The check from Five & Dime substitutes for inventory in
existence on the day of the Store's bankruptcy. However, the new
inventory of tennis bracelets does not replace the pre-petition inven-
tory, and would vastly improve Gold Digger's position.73
Furthermore, if Gold Digger could use its floating lien to claim a se-
curity interest in the new inventory, lenders like Southwest would be
unwilling to supply capital to reorganizing companies like the Store,
and that result would frustrate the rehabilitative purpose of bank-
ruptcy reorganization.'
C. A Model for Balancing State and Federal Interests
In order to distinguish assets like the Store's new inventory of
tennis bracelets from assets like proceeds of pre-petition collateral
and contractual payments, we propose a liquidation model. Debtors
have the option of filing either for a Chapter 7 liquidation7 or a
Chapter 11 reorganization. Creditors cannot always prevent a debtor
accompanying text (discussing Hastie). Recognizing Spendthrift's security interest in all
of the proceeds avoids the need for a valuation hearing. Cf. infra notes 145-51 and ac-
companying text (explaining that the liquidation model is not based on valuation).
73. See PETER F. COOGAN ETAL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 7B.05, at 7B-35 (1963) ("To allow the floating lienor to prevail as
to assets which the debtor acquired through the new value provided by the purchase
money credits arguably would give a windfall to the floating lienor.").
74. If Gold Digger could use its floating lien to claim a security interest in the tennis
bracelets, it would have a situational monopoly. Under the UCC, Southwest Bank could
have used a purchase money security interest ("PMSI") to defeat that monopoly. The
issue of situational monopolies, and the use of PMSIs to defeat them, is discussed infra
notes 94-135 and accompanying text.
75. In Chapter 7, the entity liquidates its assets. See BAIRD, supra note 12, at 5.
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from choosing liquidation.76 In a Chapter 7 liquidation, the bankrupt
entity effectively ceases its ongoing business and generates no new
assets from operations other than as may result from winding up the
business. The bankruptcy trustee is obligated to "collect and reduce
to money the property of the estate.., and close such estate as expe-
ditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in
interest."' To maximize the estate's value, the court also may
"authorize the trustee to operate the business of the debtor for a lim-
ited period, if such operation is in the best interest of the estate and
consistent with the orderly liquidation of the estate."'78 Creditors
must satisfy their claims from assets of the liquidating debtor. There-
fore, when creditors bargain for collateral, they must seek terms that
thoroughly secure them against loss in the event that the borrower
opts for a Chapter 7 liquidation,79 and they are in peril if they fail to
obtain such terms." The liquidation model would repay a secured
creditor in accordance with that scenario.
During the liquidation, some items of collateral will turn into
new assets, typically cash or accounts receivable. These new assets
replace or substitute for the original collateral. For ease of reference,
76. The debtor has the discretion to file a voluntary liquidation under Chapter 7: "A
voluntary case under a chapter of this title [11] is commenced by the filing with the bank-
ruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under such
chapter." 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994). Section 109(b) of the Code provides that any person
other than a railroad, insurance company, or bank may be a debtor under Chapter 7. See
id. § 109(b). Section 706(b) of the Code provides that, on request of a party in interest
(such as a creditor), and after notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may decide to
convert a Chapter 7 liquidation to a Chapter 11 reorganization; the creditor has no assur-
ance, however, that the court will agree to such a conversion. See id. § 706(b).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 704(1).
78. Id. § 721.
79. This Article's liquidation model looks to the day of the debtor's bankruptcy peti-
tion as the date that liquidation begins. This focus should not be confused with other
consequences of bankruptcy that are dependent on time criteria, such as whether secured
claims continue to accrue interest post-petition, see supra notes 46-47, or whether secured
creditors in a "cram down" are entitled to the value of their claims "as of the effective
date of the [debtor's] plan [of reorganization]." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
80. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (codifying the "best interests of the creditor" test
which prevents unsecured creditors from vetoing a reorganization plan under Chapter 11
if they receive the same distribution they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation). It is,
of course, ironic-but not necessarily wrong-to use a liquidation test in order to balance
the debtor's ability to achieve a fresh start by reorganizing. Perhaps the most apparent
anomaly this test raises is the possible inconsistency with § 1111(b) of the Code, which
provides that a secured creditor can protect itself from a low valuation of collateral by a
reorganizing debtor by asserting a secured claim for the full amount of the debt. See id-
§ 1111(b). The analogy to § 1111(b), however, is imprecise. It addresses valuation of
collateral that is indisputably subject to the secured creditor's lien, whereas § 552 ad-
dresses what collateral is subject to the lien in the first place.
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we will use the term "liquidating collateral" to refer to the original
collateral, and "replacement collateral" to refer to the new assets.
Most collateral, such as inventory, is liquidating collateral. Even
BioTech's contract with Gargantuan is liquidating collateral because
each payment under the contract replaces a portion of the contract.
Another example of liquidating collateral is a year-long lease.8' Sup-
pose the aggregate lease rentals are $1200. When the lessor receives
the first month's payment of $100, the remaining rentals decrease to
$1100. Under the proposed model, as is generally the case under ex-
isting law, a security interest in liquidating collateral should continue
in the replacement assets.
Sometimes new assets arise during the liquidation period with-
out the original collateral being depleted. For ease of reference we
will use the term "non-liquidating collateral" to refer to that original
collateral, and "non-replacement collateral" to refer to the new assets
to the extent they would be subject to the floating lien under non-
bankruptcy law. Should the floating lien continue on the new assets
generated from non-liquidating collateral? That is a difficult ques-
tion under existing law, where the inquiry of what constitutes
"proceeds, product, offspring, or profits" often focuses on a
"causation" test of whether new collateral is traceable to pre-petition
collateralY Tracing, however, is often confusing.Y It also can lead to
results that are clearly contrary to the Code's policy of debtor reha-
bilitation. For example, if the pre-petition floating lien covers all of a
debtor's assets, then all assets generated post-petition are arguably
traceable to pre-petition collateral. On the other hand, a secured
creditor with a floating lien on less than all a debtor's assets would
have more difficulty tracing new assets to pre-petition collateral. Se-
81. For other examples of liquidating collateral, see infra notes 160-248 and accom-
panying text.
82. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 6-77, at 416; cf. LYNN M. LOPUCKI &
ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT, A SYSTEMS APPROACH (TEACHER'S
MANUAL) 219-31 (1995) (proposing a "value tracing" theory that uses the concepts of
"proceeds, products, rents, profits, and offspring" to identify particular sets of "tracing
rules"). It is not entirely clear how to apply the value tracing theory in a bankruptcy.
Under the theory, § 552 "permits the secured creditor to trace the value of its collateral,
but it is narrower than Article 9 [partly because § 552] limits value tracing [in bankruptcy]
to five concepts: proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits." Id. at 219. These, how-
ever, are the same five concepts that underlie the value tracing theory's non-bankruptcy
tracing rules, see id. at 206, at least raising a question as to whether those concepts should
be interpreted differently in a bankruptcy.
83. Professors LoPucki and Warren acknowledge that "neither the parties that use
the terms [proceeds, product, offspring, or profits], nor the courts that interpret them,
always agree on what the rules [for tracing proceeds, product, offspring, or profits to pre-
petition collateral] are." LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 82, at 206.
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cured creditors thus would be motivated to demand a pre-petition
floating lien on all of a debtor's assets to minimize the post-petition
tracing risk.
The Code should not, however, be interpreted to lead to such
undesirable results. The liquidation model provides a solution.
Rather than focusing on the phrase "proceeds, product, offspring, or
profits" or attempting to trace post-petition collateral to pre-petition
collateral, one should make a two step inquiry.' Does the new col-
lateral replace or substitute for the existing collateral?" If not, would
the new collateral be acquired despite the debtor's liquidation?' If
the answer to either question is yes, then the new collateral would be
subject to the floating lien; but the new collateral would be unen-
cumbered if the answer to these questions is no.
What is gained by substituting the phrase "replace or substitute"
("RS") for § 552's phrase "proceeds, product, offspring, or profits"
("PPOP")? The distinction is not merely semantic. As shown below,
RS is intended to have a more limited scope than PPOP and does not
capture the entire litany that is captured by PPOP. RS merely ex-
presses the concept of replacing one form of collateral with another,
and therefore is more predictable. PPOP potentially goes beyond
that to cover all derivative or traceable collateral.
A textual analysis shows that PPOP is a broader concept than
RS. PPOP consists of four terms, only the first of which-
"proceeds"-encompasses replacement collateralY The remaining
84. The inquiry does not require a valuation. See infra text accompanying notes 148-
51. This Article also assumes that the new assets would be covered by the floating lien
under commercial law.
85. The phrase "replace or substitute for" should be interpreted by reference to the
specific items, and not generic categories, of collateral. See infra notes 180-97 and ac-
companying text.
86. As an alternative to this second step of the inquiry, one might consider asking, by
analogy to the test used under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) for lifting the automatic stay in bank-
ruptcy, whether the non-replacement collateral must remain unencumbered for a
successful reorganization? If so, the floating lien would terminate on such collateral; if
not, the lien would continue. The problem, however, with such a test is that it may be
impractical to apply. Cf. infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (discussing the two-
point test for measuring the value of collateral).
87. Proceeds includes "whatever is received upon the sale [Le., replacement by the
sale proceeds], exchange [substitution], collection [replacement by the collected cash or
other property] or other disposition [replacement by the proceeds of the disposition] of
collateral or proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1995) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Great-
West Life & Annuity Assurance Co. v. Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd., 177 B.R. 843, 853
(N.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that only proceeds, and not product, offspring or profits,
means converted property); accord Greyhound Real Estate Fin. Co. v. Official Unsecured
Creditors' Comm. (In re Northview Corp.), 130 B.R. 543 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
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terms of PPOP describe non-replacement collateral. "Product," for
example, means items of collateral produced by other items of collat-
eral without the original collateral being used up,' such as milk
produced by a cow.89 "Offspring" means the progeny of livestock-
collateral, and therefore derives from, but does not necessarily re-
place or substitute for, the original livestock. Finally," "profits"
means the income minus expenses of a business, and therefore do not
replace or substitute for the business itself. Accordingly, RS would
only include the "proceeds" component of PPOP.
Because product, offspring and profits are non-replacement col-
lateral, they are analyzed under existing law by a causation/tracing
approach. In the best of circumstances, causation is difficult to pin
down because causes can be either direct or indirect. The circum-
stances of the PPOP inquiry make causation even more difficult to
determine. By focusing only on how non-replacement collateral (i.e.,
the product, offspring, and profits) derives from non-liquidating col-
lateral, the inquiry fails on its face to take into account the effect on
the reorganizing debtor of encumbering the non-replacement collat-
eral; and that failure can tempt the courts to narrowly construe
causation to restrict encumbrances where the product, offspring and
profits are the fruits of the labor of the reorganizing debtor. Perhaps
that is why the courts are split on even such basic issues as whether
milk is the "product" of cows." This is not to say that courts cannot
reach sensible results, but they often do so for the wrong reason and
without articulating a normative rule of law.
PPOP's reliance on causation and its potential breadth therefore
make it hard to pin down. RS, in contrast, is narrower and easier to
understand. It is not, however, too narrow because the liquidation
88. This is aside from depreciation, of course. For a discussion of the relationship
between the liquidation model and depreciation, see supra text accompanying notes 41-
45.
89. Assuming, of course, that the cow itself is collateral. See Wilke Truck Serv., Inc.
v. Wiegmann (In re Wiegmann), 95 B.R. 90, 93 (Bankr. S.D. Il. 1989) (finding, where
dairy cows were collateral, that milk produced post-petition and the proceeds for its sale
were products in which creditor had security interest); In re Underbakke, 60 B.R. 705, 708
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (same).
90. Section 552(b) originally included "rents" in the litany of PPOP (or, as it would
have been called, "PPORP"). Rents were dropped when § 552 was amended in 1994 to
treat rents in a special subsection. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
394, Tit. H, § 214(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4126 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(2) (1994)).
Under this Article's liquidation model, rents would not need to be separated out because
they would constitute replacement collateral. See infra text accompanying notes 194-97.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8. The equities exception, of course, com-
pounds the court's discretion, making it even more difficult to predict consequences.
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model adds a fallback: bankruptcy also should respect a floating lien
on non-replacement collateral that would arise despite the debtor's
liquidation.' This second test expands the concept of "replace or
substitute" while avoiding the need to trace or to engage in a causa-
tion inquiry. The inquiry is therefore simplified, conceptually and in
practice. Furthermore, because it focuses on collateral that would
arise in liquidation, the inquiry is more consistent with debtor reha-
bilitation than is the PPOP inquiry under existing law.
In Part III this Article will focus on how to apply the liquidation
model, including how to determine whether new assets are acquired
despite a debtor's liquidation. It is first necessary, however, to evalu-
ate the model.
i. EVALUATING THE LIQUIDATION MODEL
This Part evaluates the proposed liquidation model under which
creditors with security interests in after-acquired collateral receive in
a reorganization what they would receive if the debtor chose to liqui-
date in bankruptcy. It concludes that the model is workable and
desirable because it balances fundamental policies underlying com-
mercial law, such as fairness, consistency, simplicity of
implementation, and clarity, 3 with the fresh start policy of bank-
ruptcy.
A. Balancing Competing Policies of Commercial Law and
Bankruptcy
The liquidation model upholds the fresh start policy of § 552 by
cutting off a typical floating lien, thereby defeating the situational
monopoly it otherwise would create in bankruptcy. To understand a
situational monopoly, recall the floating lien that Gold Digger Credit
Corp. obtained on the inventory of Jim's Jewelry Store. At the time
the Store filed a bankruptcy petition, its inventory was worth only a
nominal amount. During the reorganization, the Store decided to
92. See infra text accompanying notes 176-80 for a discussion of how to apply this
second step of the liquidation model.
93. The author has derived a set of constraints from the policies and principles un-
derlying commercial law and has suggested that these constraints would limit "ad hocery"
in the private rulemaking process and would provide a basis for judging rulemaking pro-
posals and their consequences. See Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the
Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909, 913 (1995)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Fundamental Inquiry]. The policies identified here are borrowed
from that article.
94. For a more detailed description of the scenario, see supra text accompanying
notes 73-74.
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purchase new merchandise. To make this purchase, it needed a
$150,000 line of credit, which Southwest Bank was considering offer-
ing. However, if Gold Digger's security interest extended to the new
inventory, Southwest would be unwilling to finance the reorganiza-
tion because it would be unable to use the new inventory to secure
itself against loss.' Gold Digger's security interest does not extend to
the new inventory because the underlying goods-the diamond tennis
bracelets-neither replace nor substitute for the old inventory-the
plastic rings-and also would not be acquired despite the Jewelry
Store's liquidation.
Commentators analyzing secured debt have noted a similar
situational monopoly created by a floating lien in a commercial law
context.96 Suppose that Comer Market, a grocery store, borrowed
money from National Savings & Loan, which secured the loan with a
floating lien on Comer Market's inventory, equipment, and other
assets. Comer Market then decides it could double its profits if it
buys a forklift to enable it to stock shelves more quickly. It would
like to finance the purchase of the forklift from Local Bank, which is
offering a lower interest rate than National. However, National's
floating lien has encumbered all of Comer Market's assets, and Local
will not lend unsecured. Thus, National's floating lien creates a situa-
tional monopoly because Comer Market has no collateral to offer as
security to other lenders.'
Unrestrained situational monopolies are economically inefficient
because they eliminate competition. They allow the lender who exe-
cutes a floating lien to extract monopoly profits by charging above
competitive rates on subsequent loans, or to impose the lender's
judgment on the debtor by withholding (and therefore depriving the
debtor of) new capital. Thus, commercial law has created a financing
device that limits them. Professors Jackson and Kronman, in their
seminal article explaining the economics of secured debt, showed that
95. Southwest Bank's unwillingness to finance the reorganization assumes that the
Store had no other significant assets and also was unable to provide Gold Digger ade-
quate protection to allow the granting of a senior lien under 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1994).
Cf infra notes 100-35 and accompanying text (discussing fairness of the liquidation
model).
96. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167 (1979).
97. See id. at 1158-59; cf. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS 428 (1988) (applying the situational monopoly concept in the products liability
context). For an account of why, independent of monopoly profits, Local Bank can offer
the debtor lower interest rates than National's rates, see Paul M. Shupack, Defending
Purchase Money Security Interests Under Article 9 of the UCC From Professor Buckley, 22
IND. L. REv. 777passim (1989).
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purchase money security interests ("PMSIs") can defeat the situa-
tional monopolies that floating liens create. 8 PMSIs, which are
available to creditors or vendors who provide financing for the pur-
chase of specific property, allow these persons to obtain a security
interest in that property entitled to first priority even if a secured
creditor has previously perfected a floating lien on all of the debtor's
after-acquired inventory. 9 Local therefore can lend Corner Market
money to buy the forklift and take a first priority security interest in
it. The PMSI defeats the situational monopoly by giving debtors the
opportunity to acquire new collateral at competitive interest rates
and creditors the opportunity to extend purchase money financing on
a secured basis.
Cutting off floating liens in bankruptcy achieves a similar, al-
though more far reaching, result. Southwest can lend Jim's Jewelry
Store money to buy new inventory while it is reorganizing, and the
new inventory will not be subject to Gold Digger's pre-petition
floating lien. Cutting off floating liens precludes the pre-bankruptcy
creditor from unilaterally undermining the reorganization by refusing
to make a new loan or by charging uncompetitive interest rates. The
question remains, however, whether this result is fair.
B. Fairness
Fairness is "integral to virtually all bodies of law, including
commercial law.""'  Federal bankruptcy law neither overrides that
principle nor militates that the law favor debtor rehabilitation with-
out regard for fairness to secured creditors."' Is the liquidation
model fair? We consider this question first from the standpoint of
secured creditors and the debtor, and then from the standpoint of
unsecured creditors.
98. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 96, at 1158-59. Several commentators have
criticized Jackson and Kronman's theory. See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and
Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10-11 (1981)
(arguing that the monitoring-cost theory of priority fails because it does not explain !'why
the secured creditor gains more from security than the unsecured creditors lose from it");
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 902
(1986).
99. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3) to -(4) (1995).
100. Schwarcz, Fundamental Inquiry, supra note 93, at 933.
101. Federal bankruptcy law generally protects the rights of secured creditors. See,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1994) (adequate protection); id. § 362(d) (lifting of the bankruptcy
stay); id. § 1111(b); id. § 1129(a)(7); id. § 1129(b)(2).
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1. Fairness As Between Secured Creditors and the Debtor
It previously has been noted that when secured creditors bargain
for collateral, they seek terms that thoroughly secure them against
loss in the event that the debtor opts for a Chapter 7 liquidation, and
they are at risk if they fail to obtain such terms."° The liquidation
model intentionally creates, from the secured creditor's standpoint, a
Chapter 7 liquidation scenario even in the event of a Chapter 11 re-
organization. The goal is to allow assets that would not have been
available to the secured creditor in the event of an actual Chapter 7
to be used for the debtor's Chapter 11 reorganization. This explana-
tion begs the question, however, of whether the debtor actually needs
that property in order to reorganize. Would more conventional ap-
proaches allow the debtor to reorganize, thereby avoiding the
somewhat harsh cutoff of floating liens? This Article will first show
that the conventional approaches are insufficient.
There are two possible conventional approaches that a reorgan-
izing debtor might use to finance its reorganization. The first is the
PMSI, discussed above.0 3 The second is the debtor's post-petition
borrowing powers under § 364 of the Code.04 As shown below, nei-
ther approach by itself would necessarily be sufficient to ensure that
a debtor has the financial ability to reorganize. A PMSI can be used
to defeat the situational monopoly of a lender with a floating lien.
Few would say that is unfair, because the property being acquired
through this purchase money financing device is new to the debtor
and would not have become the debtor's property but for the avail-
ability of PMSI financing. Looked at from the standpoint of the
debtor's balance sheet, the PMSI adds new assets and a new offset-
ting liability that matches those assets. 5 The cutoff in bankruptcy of
pre-petition liens is more complex, however. The liquidation model
would cut off floating liens not only on newly financed assets but also
on most other assets newly acquired by the debtor after bankruptcy.
One therefore may question whether a "blanket" cutoff of the float-
ing lien, as opposed to a cutoff only as needed to attract new
financing, is justified. Could the PMSI priority scheme be used to
102. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
103. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1994).
105. This argument assumes, however, that the newly purchased property is useful to
and does not depreciate in the hands of the debtor. Cf. Paul M. Shupack, Defining Pur-
chase Money Collateral, 29 IDAHo L. REv. 767, 773 (1992-93). In a bankruptcy, a PMSI
financing would require court approval, and creditors could object if they questioned the
value of the property being purchased. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363-364.
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attract new financing for reorganizing debtors in bankruptcy, thereby
obviating the need for a blanket cutoff?
This Article does not suggest that PMSI financing would never
be sufficient to allow debtors to finance their reorganizations. How-
ever, given that PMSI financing is limited to facilitating asset
purchases"6 and, therefore, is only a small portion of corporate fi-
nancing outside of bankruptcy, 7 this Article assumes that more than
PMSI financing generally would be needed.
Would the debtor's power to obtain post-petition secured fi-
nancing under § 364 of the Code be sufficient to finance its
reorganization? Section 364 provides that a bankruptcy court, after
notice and a hearing, may authorize the debtor to obtain post-
petition financing by granting the new lender priorities over other
unsecured financing; 8 and if the debtor is unable to obtain post-
petition financing merely through granting priorities, it may grant a
lien on unencumbered property... or a junior lien on encumbered
property."' If these methods of obtaining post-petition financing still
fail, the bankruptcy court may authorize the debtor to grant the new
lender a senior or pari passu lien on property already subject to a lien,
but only if the original secured lender is given adequate protection to
protect its collateral interest.'
With all these techniques available to finance the debtor's reor-
ganization, is a bankruptcy cutoff of floating liens still needed? The
answer is a qualified yes. Consider, for example, a floating lien on all
of a debtor's assets. If the debt secured by the floating lien approxi-
mates or exceeds the value of the collateral, then § 364 would not
help the debtor. Assume that the debtor would be unable to obtain
unsecured financing by offering a priority over other unsecured fi-
nancing, and the prospective new lender insists on a lien. However,
there would be no unencumbered property on which to grant a lien,
and (given our assumption that the existing debt exceeds the collat-
106. See U.C.C. § 9-107 (1995).
107. Most corporate financing is done on an unsecured basis, as opposed to a secured
basis. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REv.
(forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 7, on file with author). Professor Mann confirms by
empirical observation that "secured credit [is] relatively rare" for strong firms. Id. PMSI
financing is merely a subset of secured financing.
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(b), (c)(1).
109. See id. § 364(c)(2).
110. See icL § 364(c)(3).
111. See id. § 364(d). Section 364(d) provides another way to defeat a secured lender's
situational monopoly by allowing a new lender to be secured by collateral otherwise be-
longing to the original lender if the original lender is protected.
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eral value) a junior lien would have no value. Therefore, to obtain
post-petition financing, the debtor would have to offer the prospec-
tive new lender a senior orparipassu lien on property already subject
to the floating lien. It could not, however, do that under § 364 unless
the original secured lender were given adequate protection.
Adequate protection generally requires that the debtor make
cash payments or give additional or replacement collateral to the
original secured lender."' A debtor might not, however, have surplus
cash, and it may not be able to give additional or replacement collat-
eral if all of its property is already pledged under the floating lien to
the original lender. If the debtor cannot provide the original lender
with adequate protection, it will not be able to grant a senior or pari
passu lien to coax post-petition financing from the new lender. How-
ever, a bankruptcy cutoff of floating liens can avoid the need to give
the original lender adequate protection: collateral that no longer is
covered by the floating lien is freely useable by a debtor in its reor-
ganization.
The analysis now returns to whether the bankruptcy cutoff of
floating liens would be unfair to creditors secured by those liens.
This Article maintains that it is not unfair to creditors secured by
those liens so long as the security interests of those creditors are pro-
tected under the liquidation model of this Article. In a commercial
law context, fairness
helps to preserve expectations by ensuring that parties are
governed by neutral rules. In more limited circumstances,
112. See i. § 361(1)-(2). Adequate protection also would include "granting such other
relief.., as will result in the realization by [the original secured lender] of the indubitable
equivalent" of the collateral pledged to the new lender. Id. § 361(3). There are, however,
some cases holding that the adequate protection requirement need not prevent a debtor
with a viable business from reorganizing. If the court believes the business is viable, a
post-petition lien on the ongoing business may itself constitute adequate protection to
pre-petition secured creditors. See Provident Bank v. BBT (In re BBT), 11 B.R. 224,237
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1981).
Where less than all of a debtor's property is pledged, the debtor may be able to grant
additional or replacement collateral from its unencumbered assets. Also, where the debt
secured is significantly less than the value of the pledged property, the prospective new
lender may consider taking a junior lien on existing collateral. However, to draw a dis-
tinction in the application of § 552 based on these factual variations would confuse the
law. It also would lead to the anomalous and disturbing result that a lender who takes a
floating lien would have an incentive to minimize the amount of financing provided to the
debtor because only where the financing is small compared to the collateral value would
the debtor be assured of having surplus collateral on which to give junior liens under
§ 364(c)(3)-thereby discouraging a cutoff under § 552. A better solution, we believe, is
to find a more generic approach to § 552 that facilitates post-petition financing while be-
ing fair to secured creditors.
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fairness also can mean that the law should protect weaker
parties, such as those with less bargaining power; that op-
portunistic behavior should be prevented in circumstances
that could not have been contemplated in advance; and that
implicit rules of conduct should be recognized if they arise
from widespread courses of dealing in an industry or from
particular courses of dealing between specific parties."'
It is assumed in this Article that the secured party with a floating
lien is not a "weaker" party, given that it had sufficient negotiating
power to obtain the floating lien. And the balance between floating
liens and the bankruptcy cutoff neither reflects a widespread course
of dealing (otherwise this Article would be unnecessary) nor, given
its genesis from a debtor's bankruptcy filing, does it reflect a par-
ticular course of dealing between the secured party and the post-
petition debtor's trustee-in-bankruptcy.1
The liquidation model also preserves reasonable expectations.
As has been discussed, a secured creditor cannot always rely on tak-
ing as collateral future assets whose existence depends on a bankrupt
debtor's continuing in business. Future collateral is speculative be-
cause the debtor may cease doing business and liquidate. 5 The
floating lien of UCC section 9-204 was never intended to grant a se-
cured creditor a right to speculative collateral.1 So long as the
secured creditor's floating lien continues pursuant to the liquidation
model of this Article, the secured creditor receives a bargain that
113. Schwarcz, Fundamental Inquiry, supra note 93, at 913 n.7 (citation omitted).
114. The post-petition debtor and its trustee-in-bankruptcy are different legal entities
than the pre-petition debtor.
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994); cf id § 706 (allowing conversion to a case under chap-
ter 11, 12 or 13 to chapter 7); see also supra notes 75-76 (discussing chapter 7 liquidation
and chapter 11 reorganization). One may argue that taking future collateral in a debtor
that is a going concern should not be speculative because the expectation is that the
debtor's business will continue. If, however, this expectation is reasonable because the
debtor has a strong business, then it is unlikely that the debtor will become the subject of
a bankruptcy case in the first place, the pre-condition for applying § 552. On the other
hand, if the debtor has a weak business, its chance of bankruptcy is higher and then the
expectation may not be entirely reasonable. Therefore the stronger the debtor, the less
reasonable this expectation but the less likely it is that § 552 will apply; whereas the
weaker the debtor, the more reasonable this expectation and the more likely it is that
§ 552 will apply. Nonetheless, one still may argue that the floating lien could have been
taken when the debtor's business is strong. However, that argument is not compelling
because creditors only tend to demand collateral from weak debtors. See Mann, supra
107 (manuscript at 7). Ultimately one must recognize there may be individual cases
where a creditor's reasonable expectations would be impaired by this Article's liquidation
model. But that is a necessary cost of balancing competing commercial law and bank-
ruptcy policies.
116. See U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (1995).
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ought to have been within its range of reasonable expectations.
One may ask whether a model that artificially assumes a debtor's
liquidation is fair to a creditor with a floating lien if the debtor suc-
cessfully reorganizes in bankruptcy. A related question is whether
the model works if a solvent company were to file for bankruptcy.17
In these cases, one might argue that limiting the creditor to assets ac-
quired in a liquidation could lead to abuse of the bankruptcy laws.
Companies are rational maximizers and might limit the amount it
costs them to borrow money by filing for bankruptcy when they have
little after-acquired property in their possession. The answer to both
questions is that the model works because the Code protects unse-
cured as well as secured creditors."' If the collateral value does not
cover the creditor's loan, the creditor has an unsecured claim under
present law for the amount of the deficiency.119 If the company is sol-
vent, the creditor should be able to collect its full claim m. 20
A cutoff of the floating lien as to assets generated by the
debtor's ongoing business is not only fair to secured creditors but also
may be necessary to afford a debtor an opportunity to try to reor-
ganize in bankruptcy and achieve a fresh start. The first courts to
117. Although many companies that file for bankruptcy are insolvent, solvent compa-
nies can and sometimes do file. Consider, for example, the filings by Dow Coming,
Texaco, and Johns-Manville. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 198 B.R. 214 (Bankr. E. D.
Mich. 1996); In re Texaco, Inc., 109 B.R. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (filing resulted from $10.5
billion verdict against Texaco which Texaco was appealing); In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
68 B.R. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd in part, rev'd in part, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd
sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636 (2d
Cir. 1988). The Code does not bar solvent companies from filing because it provides no
financial standards for filing a voluntary petition. See also 11 U.S.C. § 301 (providing for
voluntary cases under Chapter 11); Chaim J. Fortgang & Lawrence P. King, The 1978
Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148, 1160 (1981) (stating that
"[iun the context of very large chapter 11 cases, depending on the length of the proceed-
ings, solvency may not be terribly unlikely").
118. The Code consistently protects creditors from debtors who try to abuse it. For
example, to prevent debtors from denying unsecured creditors the time value of their
money, the Code has adopted the "best interests of the creditors" test in § 1129(a)(7).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1994). This provision requires that impaired creditors receive
at least what they would get in a Chapter 7 liquidation. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, if the
estate is solvent after all of the claims have been satisfied, the debtor must pay unsecured
creditors post-petition interest at the legal rate from the date that the petition was filed
on their claims. See id. § 726(a)(5). Thus, in a reorganization, impaired creditors must
get post-petition interest on their claims if the debtor is solvent. Fortgang and King have
noted that the debtor may have some room to deny creditors the time value of their
money insofar as the legal rate of interest is different from the contract rate for which the
creditor bargained. See Fortgang & King, supra note 117, at 1151-53.
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
120. The potential for abuse also will be limited by reputation. Creditors will be wary
about making loans to a company that has previously filed for bankruptcy in bad faith.
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recognize the Code's fresh start policy, the discharge of financial ob-
ligations in exchange for nonexempt assets, applied it to individuals,
not to corporations."' However, since the early cases were decided,
the fresh start policy has been applied to corporations as well. As
Professor Block-Lieb has stated, "[b]y encouraging debtors to file
voluntary petitions before they either become insolvent or are unable
to pay debts as they come due, Congress sought to... facilitate the
rehabilitation of financially troubled business debtors.""
After-acquired property can be crucial to a reorganization.
Debtors need to pay employees, retool factories, explore new prod-
uct lines. Obtaining capital can be expensive because prospective
lenders may see the reorganizing debtor as a credit risk and thus de-
mand a high rate of interest; indeed, they may conclude that the
debtor is such a risk that they cannot make a loan at all. To the ex-
tent that after-acquired property can be freed from the speculative
impact of floating liens, the debtor will have a greater opportunity to
reorganize.
2. Fairness to Unsecured Creditors
Lastly, we examine fairness from the standpoint of unsecured
creditors-particularly involuntary creditors who had no opportunity
to bargain and are, effectively, subordinated to creditors with floating
liens. To some extent, this raises the ongoing controversy of whether
security interests themselves are fair to unsecured creditors1 3 This
Article does not purport to resolve that controversy but merely notes
121. Notably, Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934), which is often cited as
the case that established the availability of the fresh start to all debtors, made the fresh
start available to an individual, not a corporation. Other early cases also made the fresh
start available to individuals, not corporations. See Williams v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549,554-55 (1915); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68,77 (1904).
European countries have never championed the fresh start doctrine. See J.H.
DALHUISEN, 1 DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY
§ 1.01[1] (1986). Instead, they have used bankruptcy laws as a collection mechanism for
creditors. Despite the recent trend in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Italy of
using short judicial stays to give corporate debtors a chance to regroup, see id., European
legislators have been unwilling to create a right of legal discharge for debtors or a statu-
tory scheme for corporate reorganization.
122. Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Anal-
ogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 337,424 (1993).
123. See David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV.
2179, 2179-81 (1994); Schwartz, supra note 98, at 33-37; Scott, supra note 98, at 904-12;
Paul M. Shupack, Solving The Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067,
1073-85 (1989).
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that security interests have been around for thousands of years, 124 and
a technique that endures time and experience should not be rejected
without a compelling reason. Whether pure theory can provide that
compelling reason is at least questionable.
Furthermore, scholarly articles'" addressing the secured credit
controversy do not always distinguish between pre-existing creditors
receiving security for antecedent debt-in which case "the granting of
security reduces the assets on which the remaining unsecured credi-
tors can levy and thereby increases the risk for such unsecured
creditors" 1 -and the situation where lenders "offer new money at
lower interest rates in return for security."' 27 In the latter case, the
granting of security does not necessarily reduce the assets on which
unsecured creditors can levy because the debtor receives the loan
proceeds. To the extent the law is concerned with the debtor misus-
ing those proceeds, that concern is more appropriately governed by
fraudulent conveyance and preference laws."
Floating liens should be analyzed using the same distinction be-
tween liens securing antecedent debt and those given in order to
attract new money. The following discussion will focus on the latter
case, where the floating lien is granted not to secure an existing debt
but rather to enable the debtor to borrow new funds. Even in that
case, however, floating liens exacerbate the fairness controversy over
secured credit because of their seemingly insidious nature of attach-
ing to assets not yet in existence. Voluntary creditors will be alerted
124. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 24:10-13 (discussing the pledge by a poor man of his
cloak).
125. See Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puz-
zle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993); Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for
Secured Transactions: Foxes with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 KAN. L. REV. 13
(1993); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996); F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority
Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986); Carlson, supra note 123; Harris & Mooney, supra
note 63; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 96; Schwartz, supra note 98; Scott, supra note
98; Shupack, supra note 123; James J. White, Work and Play in Revising Article 9, 80 VA.
L. REv. 2089 (1994).
126. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 25, at 148 n.52.
127. See id. at 148 n.52. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Pri-
ority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: A Response to Professors Bebchuk and Fried
passim (work in progress, on file with author) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Easy Case] (arguing
that an analysis of the priority of secured claims not only must distinguish new money
liens from liens securing antecedent debt but also must recognize that in an imperfect
universe there is a distinction between the use of secured credit and the availability (and
use only if needed for liquidity) of secured credit).
128. A secured creditor also may have an obligation in limited circumstances to moni-
tor the debtor's use of proceeds. See Schwarcz, Easy Case, supra note 127, at 11-15.
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to this when extending credit by searching UCC filing records," and
they can impose covenant restrictions on the debtor's creation of
floating liens or else price their loans accordingly. Involuntary credi-
tors, however, can do neither. It is the drama of seeing a debtor's
newly arising assets being inexorably attached by the floating lien
that creates the perception of unfairness. That drama, however, is
more a soap opera than a tragedy. The creditor with a floating lien
can never receive more from the collateral than its principal and ac-
crued interest.1" The surplus collateral will be available to repay
unsecured creditors, including any involuntary creditors. Further-
more, and this is most significant, a floating lien, even one securing
new money, may be subject to bankruptcy preference law.13' Prefer-
ence law is intended to assure equality of distribution of a debtor's
estate to all creditors, including unsecured creditors. It does that by
various means, including voiding transfers of collateral made, and
floating liens on assets coming into existence, within ninety days of an
insolvent debtor's bankruptcy."' Because floating liens are subject to
the same bankruptcy policy that governs other prebankruptcy trans-
fers, they are not per se unfair to unsecured creditors.
Preference law would not apply if the debtor were solvent at the
time the transfer of collateral occurs 3 in the case of floating liens,
at the time of the acquisition of the asset to which the lien attaches.
However, a solvent debtor by definition has sufficient assets to pay its
129. See U.C.C. § 9-302 (1995).
130. See id. § 9-502(2). Reasonable expenses are also allowed. See id. § 9-504(1)(a).
131. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994). That is because a floating lien secures a loan already
made. Of course, some items of collateral may become subject to the floating lien within
days or weeks of the making of the loan and therefore qualify for the § 547(c)(1) exemp-
tion as a "contemporaneous exchange for new value." Id. § 547(c)(1)(a). However, most
items of collateral covered by the floating lien would be expected to arise after that time.
There is some ambiguity whether after-acquired collateral arising in the debtor's or-
dinary course of business is subject to preference law. U.C.C. § 9-108 provides that a
"security interest in ... after-acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new
value and not as security for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such
collateral ... in the ordinary course of his business .... " U.C.C. § 9-108 (1995). Federal
preference law, however, appears inconsistent with state commercial law. While § 547(b)
covers "any transfer" of an interest in property made within 90 days of an insolvent
debtor's bankruptcy and § 547(e)(3) provides that a transfer is not made until the debtor
has rights in the property, § 547(c)(5) exempts floating liens on inventory and receivables
that do not improve the secured party's position prior to bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 547.
Taken together, these bankruptcy. law sections suggest that floating liens on inventory and
receivables that do improve the secured party's position, and floating liens on other types
of collateral (such as equipment), would be subject to preference law. See infra discussion
in notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
132. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
133. See id. § 547(b)(3).
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liabilities.1' So long as the debtor is solvent, unsecured creditors, in-




The liquidation model is consistent not only with the Code's
fresh start policy but also with analogous sections of the Code. Con-
sistency is crucial because "the lack of internal consistency ... in [a]
statute.., is the best possible assurance that in the long run construc-




Section 547(c)(5) of the Code137 is particularly instructive be-
cause it deals with the pre-bankruptcy transfer of property secured by
a floating lien. As Professor Baird states:
The prospect of a bankruptcy case might have the effect of
134. The Code even includes contingent liabilities in making the determination of
insolvency. See id. § 101(5), (12), (32).
135. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17
CARDOZO L. REv. 647, 663-68 (1996). For a contrary view, see Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887,1896-1923 (1994).
136. David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J.
185, 225 (1967). Although Mellinkoff discusses consistency within the UCC, his com-
ments are equally applicable to other statutes. See also Schwarcz, Fundamental Inquiry,
supra note 93, at 940-44 (noting the importance of consistency between commercial law
and related bodies of law).
137. The text of § 547(c)(5) provides:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or
the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such
transfers to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of
the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured
claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such security interest
exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the later of-
(A)(i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this
section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this
section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; or
(3) the date on which new value was first given under the security
agreement creating such security interest...
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5). For general discussions of § 547(c)(5), see BAIRD, supra note 12, at
181-85; Neil B. Cohen, "Value" Judgments: Accounts Receivable Financing and Voidable
Preferences Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 66 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1982); Note, Trus-
tees Do It Better: Analyzing Section 547(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 1285 (1992). The analogy between § 547 and § 552, although tempting, is imprecise
because the conceptual basis of § 547 (avoiding preferential transfers) is equality of dis-
tribution among creditors whereas the conceptual basis of § 552 is facilitating a debtor's
right to a fresh start.
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accelerating and exacerbating the creditors' race to the as-
sets. In order to solve this gun-jumping problem, we need a
bankruptcy rule that has the effect of turning back the clock
and returning people to the positions they were in before
bankruptcy was on the horizon.'
To this end, § 547(c)(5) "codifies [an] improvement in position
test." '139 When the secured party is not an insider, the trustee meas-
ures the value of the collateral and the amount of the debt on two
dates: (1) ninety days before the debtor files the bankruptcy petition;
and (2) the day the debtor files the petition. Using this two-point
test, the trustee first determines whether the collateral is worth less
than the debt ninety days before the debtor files the petition. Then
she determines whether the gap between the debt and the collateral
has decreased because the debtor has transferred assets to the credi-
tor in satisfaction of the debt. The trustee will find that the debtor
has made a preferential transfer if an undersecured creditor's posi-
tion improved, to the prejudice of unsecured creditors, during the
ninety day period.'
Commentators have struggled to explain § 547(c)(5)'s mechani-
cal rule."' Many have emphasized that the drafters wanted to keep
secured creditors from getting "too much."' 42 When he was sitting
with the First Circuit, Justice Breyer wrote an opinion explaining
when secured creditors get too much under § 547(c)(5): 43
[Section 547(c)(5)] protects new receivables from prefer-
ence challenges ... only insofar as they substitute for old
ones. Insofar as the grant of a security interest in the new
collateral (receivables or inventory that comes into exis-
tence during the preference period) improves the creditor's
position (compared to his position at the beginning of the
preference period), the grant of security constitutes a pref-
erence to the extent of the improvement!"
Under this reasoning, the creditor that secures itself with a
138. BAIRD, supra note 12, at 165.
139. S. REP. No. 95-989 at 88 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5874; see
also H.R. REP. No. 95-595 at 373-74 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6329-
30.
140. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5).
141. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV.
725, 774-77 (1984); see also Note, supra note 137, at 1289-92 (stating that the application
of § 547(c)(5) often leads to contradictory results).
142. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective: A Rejoinder, 30
UCLA L. REV. 617,630 (1983).
143. See Braunstein v. Karger (In re Melon Produce, Inc.), 976 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 1992).
144. Id. at 75.
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floating lien gambles that the debtor will have enough inventory and
receivables at any time to cover any loss the creditor may suffer.
When bankruptcy is imminent and the creditor has lost its gamble, it
should have to compete with unsecured creditors for the amount of
its undersecured claim. In the absence of § 547(c)(5), the creditor
may have been able to coerce the debtor on the eve of bankruptcy to
increase the inventory or transfer assets in order to decrease the
creditor's losses. Congress precludes secured creditors from obtain-
ing this improvement at the expense of unsecured creditors. The
liquidation model proposed in this Article therefore is consistent with
§ 547(c)(5) in that it precludes secured creditors from improving their
position at the expense of a debtor's right to a fresh start.
D. Simplicity of Implementation
In addition to being fair to both debtors and creditors and con-
sistent with the policies underlying the Code, the proposed model is
relatively simple to implement. Simplicity of implementation has two
aspects: "First, it should be simple to understand how to apply com-
mercial law. In this sense, simplicity is related to the principle of
clarity,[. 5] which maintains that the law should be straightforward,
unambiguous, and clear. Second, the implementation of commercial
law should be practical and cost-effective."' "
The liquidation model addresses both these aspects. It provides
an intuitive and common sense approach by which parties can bal-
ance floating liens with the bankruptcy cutoff. Nonetheless, it may
not always be obvious how to determine whether particular items of
non-replacement collateral would arise in a debtor's liquidation. Ul-
timately, that will be a question of fact for the judge. The
applications section of this Article,147 however, will show that deter-
mination is practical and cost-effective in most cases.
When evaluating the liquidation model, one also might ask
whether it would be even simpler to propose a variation on the model
that pays the secured creditor the liquidation value of its pre-petition
collateral.48 Such a model would be misplaced, however. The focus
145. Discussed infra in text accompanying note 152.
146. Schwarcz, Fundamental Inquiry, supra note 93, at 939 (citations omitted).
147. See infra notes 160-248 and accompanying text.
148. After all, liquidation valuation, such as the so-called "best interests" test in bank-
ruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1994), is easier to determine than going concern
valuation, such as under the "cramdowm" test in bankruptcy. See id § 1129(b)(2). Under
the former, one need only value the collateral, not the entire company. See Peter V. Pan-
taleo & Barry W. Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 BuS. LAW. 419,420-27 (1996).
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under bankruptcy's cutoff of floating liens is not on the value of post-
petition collateral but rather on which post-petition assets are encum-
bered by the pre-petition floating lien. A liquidation value model also
would fail to recognize non-replacement collateral, which is not in
existence at the time of bankruptcy. Furthermore, liquidation valua-
tion would be inconsistent with bankruptcy law, which generally gives
secured creditors a secured claim equal to the non-liquidation value
of the collateral,149 and also allows a secured creditor in a Chapter 11
reorganization who believes even this valuation is too low to elect to
have its claim treated as a secured claim for the entire amount of the
debt.5 The task is therefore to identify the post-petition collateral,
and that is the role of the liquidation model proposed by this Article.
It may, or may not, later be necessary to value that collateral.'
E. Clarity
The liquidation model also would bring clarity to an area of law
that is profoundly ambiguous. "Clarity is important to minimize mis-
takes, ambiguities, and resulting disputes and litigation. Clarity also
helps to preserve expectations, which is essential to market transac-
tions... [and] minimizes misinterpretations by judges and
practitioners.',
5 2
To some extent, the need for clarity would override any argu-
ments that the liquidation model either is too pro-creditor or too pro-
debtor. Ambiguity is a worse alternative if creditors cannot rely on
their floating liens and are compelled to price their loans accordingly.
The liquidation model enables the parties to understand their rights
and therefore more accurately price the transaction.
III. COMPARISON OF PROPOSAL AND EXISING LAW
This Part examines § 552 of the Bankruptcy Code, the provision
of federal law governing after-acquired collateral in bankruptcy, and
the case law construing it."' It shows that the existing case law is
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
150. See id. § 1111(b), which overrides § 506(a).
151. See, e.g., id. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1129(b)(2).
152. Schwarcz, Fundamental Inquiry, supra note 93, at 928 (footnotes omitted).
153. For other articles discussing § 552, see Craig H. Averch, The Heartbreak Hotel for
Secured Lenders: When Postpetition Revenue from a Hotel is Not Subject to a Prepetition
Security Interest, 107 BANKING L.J. 484, 484-90 (1990) (arguing that bankruptcy courts
should not treat hotel revenues differently from other income-producing real property
and that these revenues are proceeds within the meaning of § 552(b)); R. Wilson Freyer-
muth, Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism in the Bankruptcy Courts: Implications
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sometimes confusing and disjointed. This Part also applies the liqui-
dation model, and shows that it would help to bring order and
predictability. Annex B summarizes the differences in outcomes dis-
cussed in this Article between existing law and the liquidation model.
A. Section 552 4
Recall that § 552(a) cuts off floating liens in bankruptcy,' while
§ 552(b) preserves security interests in "proceeds, product, offspring,
or profits" of property secured pre-petition.'56 In the legislative his-
tory of § 552, Congress explained that "[t]he term 'proceeds' ...
covers any property into which property subject to the security inter-
est is converted.' '57 It also stated that § 552(b) "cover[s] the situation
where raw materials, for example, are converted into inventory, or
inventory into accounts...., 55
Thus, § 552 superficially appears consistent with the model inso-
far as it cuts off floating liens and defines proceeds as substituting for
the property secured pre-petition. Discrepancies between § 552 and
the model arise, however, because ambiguities '59 in § 552 together
with § 552(b)'s equities exception allow bankruptcy courts great lati-
tude. One can read § 552 to cut off floating liens on assets that
substitute for existing collateral, or to enforce such liens on all of a
bankrupt debtor's derivative assets, no matter how remote. The
cases discussed below are illustrative of the problem, and the solution
provided by the model.
B. Case Law Categories
This subpart discusses the categories of case law construing § 552
for Reforming Commercial Real Estate Finance, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1467 (1993)
(arguing that monies paid by commercial occupants are proceeds of the commercial real
estate development and should be protected in bankruptcy under § 552(b)); Philip L.
Kunkel, Farmers' Relief Under the Bankruptcy Code: Preserving the Farmers' Property, 29
S.D. L. REV. 303, 328-32 (1984) (briefly describing the impact of § 552(b) on security
interests in the proceeds of crops, milk); Jeffrey L. Tarkenton, Proceeds in Bankruptcy:
United Virginia Bank v. Slab Fork Coal Company, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 783, 785 (1987)
(examining the Slab Fork decision and predicting its effect on the financing of coal com-
panies).
154. For the text of § 552, see supra note 6.
155. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 48, § 23-6.
156. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b).
157. H.R. REP No. 95-595, at 377 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6333.
158. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 91 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5877.
159. Congress did not define the terms "product, offspring, [and] profits." The UCC
likewise does not define these terms.
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and explains how the outcomes would differ under the model. The
reader should note that the outcomes also may differ in light of the
difference between the liquidation model and the "equities excep-
tion," discussed in Part III.C of this Article.
1. Dividends
The best-known case considering the treatment of dividends1"
under § 552 is In re Hastie 6' In Hastie, Acquisition Management, a
successor-in-interest of the FDIC, acquired a security interest in
stock and any future dividends of the stock owned by the debtor,
Hastie. The FDIC perfected its interest in the stock by taking pos-
session of the certificated and registered securities. After Hastie filed
for bankruptcy, the issuer of the stock continued to pay cash divi-
dends to the registered owner, Hastie. Because the FDIC had not
perfected its interest in the dividends, it claimed that its perfected
security interest in the stock extended to the dividends as proceeds of
the stock.6 2 Hastie argued that the dividends were not proceeds, and
therefore he should be allowed to use the dividends in his reorganiza-
tion.
The Tenth Circuit held that the FDIC could prevail only if its se-
curity interest in the dividends was perfected in accordance with state
law. The dividends would be perfected if they constituted proceeds
under state law."' According to the court, however, the dividends did
not constitute proceeds because the UCC (the applicable state law)
definition of proceeds in section 9-306(4) "describes an event
whereby one asset is disposed of and another is acquired as its substi-
tute."1'  Cash dividends "bear[] no resemblance to the events
160. On the related issue of stock splits, see FDIC v. Whitaker (In re Whitaker), 18
B.R. 314,316 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (holding that "when a creditor takes a secirity inter-
est in shares of stock it is a fair inference that he intends that his security interest continue
in the additional shares from a stock split, so that he may retain a security interest in the
same proportionate interest in the corporation."). However, Whitaker portended the
problems with floating liens on dividends when it distinguished the stock split from divi-
dends: "[A] stock split is an accounting device, not a distribution of corporate earnings,
like a cash or stock dividend." Id.
161. 2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993); see Gerald T. McLaughlin & Neil B. Cohen, A Pro-
ceeds/Profit Puzzle, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 12, 1994, at 3.
162. See Hastie, 2 F.3d at 1043-44 (discussing the FDIC's claim that cash dividends
were proceeds of the stock). Recall that this Article uses the term "floating lien" broadly
to include post-petition collateral consisting of proceeds of pre-petition collateral. See
supra note 2.
163. See Hastie, 2 F.3d at 1045-46. Under state law, the cash dividends were not sepa-
rately perfected. See id. at 1047.
164. Id. at 1045.
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specified in the definition of proceeds or to an act of disposition gen-
erally."' '  While "the cash dividend distributes assets of the
corporation, it does not alter the ownership interest represented by
the stock. [Thus, it] is not a disposition of the stock."'
166
The Hastie opinion is confusing because the court appears unde-
cided whether its decision is based on state perfection law or on § 552
of the Code. 7 To the extent Hastie turned solely on the state law
perfection issue, its significance is limited because the FDIC could
have separately perfected its security interest in the cash dividends
under state law.161 Viewing Hastie from the standpoint of § 552, how-
ever, raises several interesting issues. Assuming the perfection under
state law of the FDIC's floating lien on the dividends, would such a
lien have applied to the dividends under bankruptcy law? The an-
swer is ambiguous under the current text of § 552(b): "[I]f the [pre-
petition] security interest ... extends to ... proceeds, product, off-
spring, or profits of [pre-petition] property, then such security
interest extends to such proceeds, product, offspring, or profits ac-
quired by the estate after the commencement of the case....""'
The dilemma is that a floating lien usually applies to the debtor's
existing and future assets and their proceeds. The litany of derivative
products listed by § 552 neither corresponds to language used in the
UCC nor, under the UCC, would need to be described in the security
agreement because of the broad floating lien permitted by section 9-
204.
The better view of Hastie70 would appear to be that, if perfected,
the FDIC's lien should have applied to the dividends under bank-
ruptcy law. From the standpoint of state law, the dividends clearly
would be covered by the floating lien on future assets.' And from
the standpoint of bankruptcy law, § 552(b)'s broad categories of
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1046.
167. Compare id. at 1043 ("The issue in this case is whether a perfected security inter-
est in ... stock continues in cash dividends paid on that stock under the Uniform
Commercial Code .... "), with id. at 1044 ("The threshold issue in this case is whether
after-acquired property [cash dividends] is subject to a pre-petition security interest under
bankruptcy law.") (citing 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)).
168. The trustee in bankruptcy can avoid an unperfected security interest. See 11
U.S.C. § 544 (1994). The FDIC could have perfected, for example, by recording stock
ownership in its name. See Hastie, 2 F.3d at 1047. Furthermore, the UCC governing body
is considering a change to U.C.C. § 9-306(1) to expand the definition of "proceeds" to
include, among other things, stock dividends. See PEB REPORT, supra note 58, at 106-07.
169. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
170. This assumes state law perfection.
171. See U.C.C. § 9-204 (1995).
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"product" and "profits" arguably would cover stock dividends irre-
spective of whether dividends constitute "proceeds," which the Hastie
court held they did not.1
Using the liquidation model of this Article to analyze the prob-
lem, one should first ask whether the dividends substitute for or
replace the stock. This question poses a problem with stock because
the asset represented by the stock-an ownership interest in a corpo-
ration ---is not necessarily the same as the corporation's underlying
assets. Nonetheless, by analogy to depreciating collateral, one can
hypothesize the following test. If payment of the dividend would
plainly reduce the stock's value, then the dividend substitutes for a
portion of the stock and, accordingly, the floating lien should encum-
ber the dividend. A "liquidating dividend," constituting a
distribution of assets to shareholders by a company in liquidation, is
an obvious example of a dividend that substitutes for a portion of the
stock.74
Payment of a dividend could plainly reduce the value of stock in
other circumstances. If one holds stock in a privately owned com-
pany-that is, a company whose stock is not publicly traded so the
stock value essentially represents the underlying asset value plus the
company's good will-the separation between the stock and the un-
derlying assets is somewhat transparent. Payment of a dividend
would plainly reduce the amount of underlying assets, and therefore
the value of the stock. The dividend again would substitute for a por-
tion of the stock, and the floating lien should attach to the dividend.
Stock of privately owned companies, and of companies in liqui-
dation, therefore constitutes liquidating collateral, and dividends of
such stock would be replacement collateral. On the other hand, stock
of publicly traded companies is not so clearly liquidating collateral
because payment of an ordinary dividend on publicly traded stock
does not necessarily reduce the stock's value by the amount of the
dividend.'75 Although payment of a dividend technically diminishes
172. See Hastie, 2 F.3d at 1045-46.
173. See id. at 1046.
174. See Aycock v. Texas Commerce Bank, 127 B.R. 17, 18-19 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991)
(holding that liquidating dividends were to be considered proceeds of stock); cf supra
notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing depreciating collateral).
175. A dividend represents a decision by a company's directors to distribute certain
assets to equity holders as opposed to using those assets for another purpose, such as cor-
porate growth; and, to that extent, the dividend replaces that other use. However, the
dividend should be compared to the stock value because it is the stock, and not the com-
pany's underlying assets, that is the collateral. There is, of course, some reduction in
short term stock value as evidenced by the stock pages of newspapers which indicate
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the liquidation value of the company issuing the dividend, investors
value publicly traded stock less by the company's liquidation value
and more by other factors exogenous to the company that signal a
going concern, such as a multiple of corporate earnings."' The
amount of the dividend is usually small enough relative to the stock
price that these exogenous matters have more influence on investors
than does the fact of the stock's trading ex-dividend.
Dividends on publicly traded stock therefore are non-
replacement collateral because their value does not plainly correlate
to the reduction in stock value. We then must go to the second step
of the inquiry under the liquidation model and ask whether those
dividends would be acquired by the debtor despite its liquidation. If
the answer is yes, the dividends would be subject to the floating lien;
if no, the dividends would be unencumbered.
How should one determine what collateral would be acquired by
a debtor in a liquidation? The question sounds like conjuring but it is
really quite straightforward. One simply asks, with regard to each
item of non-replacement collateral that actually is acquired by the
debtor during its bankruptcy case, whether that item would have
been acquired by the debtor if it were in liquidation. This part of the
Article deals with stock dividends. One need not try to figure out
what dividends would arise during the debtor's bankruptcy. Rather,
one merely looks to the dividends that actually are paid to the debtor
during its reorganization in bankruptcy and asks whether those divi-
dends would have been paid if the debtor were in a Chapter 7
liquidation" rather than a reorganization.78 If they would have been
paid, the dividends would be subject to the floating lien; if they would
not have been paid, the dividends would be unencumbered."7 In a
whether the stock is trading ex-dividend. On the other hand, corporate finance theory
maintains that a long-standing dividend policy is good for the price of stock. See Zohar
Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 YALE L.J. 881,882,885-86 (1995).
176. See WILBUR G. LEWELLEN, THE COST OF CAPITAL 88-93 (1969).
177. Of course, if the debtor actually liquidates in a Chapter 7 case, then all non-
replacement collateral would be subject to the floating lien.
178. By the same token, one should not assume that the stock is sold in a liquidation
and the dividends would not arise.
179. As an example of non-replacement collateral that would not arise in a liquidation,
consider a lease that is entered into by a debtor during its bankruptcy reorganization; and
assume that under non-bankruptcy law the floating lien covers leases but does not cover
the underlying assets that are to be leased. If the reorganizing debtor enters into a new
lease in connection with the ongoing operation of the business and that new lease would
not have been needed if the debtor were liquidating, then the new lease would not be
subject to the floating lien. Another example of non-liquidating collateral that, under the
liquidation model, would not be subject to a floating lien is a factory that is subject to a
floating lien under non-bankruptcy law but that the reorganizing debtor builds using un-
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dispute, of course, the ultimate determination would be made by the
court.
Ordinary dividends on publicly traded stock are paid at the dis-
cretion of the corporation issuing the stock. Payment is unrelated to
the circumstances of the debtor that happens to own the stock; the
estate of a liquidating debtor would be entitled to the same dividends
as the estate of a debtor that continued in business. Therefore, under
the second prong of the liquidation model, ordinary dividends on
publicly traded stock would appear to be encumbered by the floating
lien because such dividends would be acquired by the debtor despite
its liquidation.
Questions can arise, however, as to how long the liquidating
debtor would continue before ceasing to exist as an entity and what
effect its non-existence would have on subsequent dividends? The
answer to the first question would vary from case to case, and ulti-
mately is a question of fact. Must the court hold a factual inquiry for
each case? That would create a difficult burden for the judge. Fur-
thermore, if the answer to the second question is that floating liens
on subsequent dividends are cut off, that would be unfair to the se-
cured creditor because, in an actual liquidation, the stock would be
sold at or before the end of the case, and the secured creditor's lien
(even under existing § 552(b)) would attach to the sale proceeds. If,
therefore, the liquidation model were to cut off floating liens on sub-
sequent dividends, it should allow the secured creditor to retain a lien
on the stock to the extent of its then applicable sale value. Yet that
would further complicate the inquiry because the judge now must
determine not only the hypothetical liquidation period but also the
collateral's value at the end of that period. To avoid these complica-
tions, we propose that the liquidation model be simplified by making
the assumption, imperfect as it may be, that the debtor's liquidation
period will exactly equal the period of the debtor's Chapter 11 reor-
ganization case. That avoids the need to make any factual inquiry or
valuation. Applying the liquidation model and this assumption to the
stock hypothetical, all dividends arising during the debtor's reorgani-
zation would be encumbered by the floating lien.
2. Inventory
Under the liquidation model, as under existing § 552, handling
most cases involving inventory is simple. Inventory is liquidating
collateral. When the debtor sells inventory, it obtains cash or ac-
encumbered funds.
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counts receivable in return. The cash or accounts replaces and substi-
tutes for the original collateral. The secured creditor therefore
should have a security interest in the cash or accounts. The same re-
suit would be achieved under existing law.'so This result would obtain
even if, as is normally the case, the sale price of the inventory exceeds
the inventory's cost to the debtor. Under the model, derivative assets
that replace or substitute for pre-petition collateral are treated as if
they constitute pre-petition collateral, and the secured party will be
entitled to any appreciation in value.181
If the cash or accounts are subsequently used by the debtor to
acquire new inventory, the new inventory would replace or substitute
for such cash or accounts, and the secured party again will be entitled
to any appreciation in value. This issue of whether a creditor can
claim a security interest in second generation inventory is illustrated
by In re Bumper Sales, Inc.' There, Marepcon loaned Bumper Sales
$510,000 in order to expand its inventory of bumpers.'3 In return,
Bumper Sales gave Marepcon a security interest in " 'all of... [its]
inventory, accounts receivable, contract rights, furniture, fixtures and
equipment, general intangibles, now owned or hereafter-acquired
and the proceeds from said collateral.' "'. Marepcon perfected by
filing financing statements. When Bumper Sales filed for bankruptcy
in August 1988, it owed Marepcon $499,964, and its inventory of
bumpers was worth $769,000.'m Marepcon consented to Bumper
Sales' use of the proceeds of pre-petition inventory to finance the
purchase of post-petition inventory. 6 On March 31, 1989, Marepcon
stated a claim of $500,000 against Bumper Sales, asserted a security
interest in its inventory, and sought adequate protection for this secu-
rity interest." The Unsecured Creditors Committee argued that
§ 552(a) cut off Marepcon's security interest in Bumper Sales' post-
petition inventory and accounts." Marepcon rebutted, stating that
its security interest was valid because the post-petition inventory and
accounts were "proceeds of Bumper Sales' pre-petition inventory and
accounts [and noting] that Bumper Sales' post-petition inventory was
180. Indeed, the cash or accounts easily would qualify as proceeds under § 552(b).
181. See supra note 40 (citing Dewsnup v. Timm. 502 U.S. 410 (1992)).
182. 907 F.2d 1430 (4th Cir. 1990).




187. See id. at 1433.
188. See id. at 1436.
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financed solely by the proceeds of its pre-petition inventory and ac-
counts." ' 9
The court held that Bumper Sales' post-petition inventory and
accounts constituted proceeds within the meaning of § 552(b).1
Quoting Professor Barkley Clark, the Bumper Sales court reasoned
that drawing a bright line "'between first-generation proceeds and
after-acquired property... could completely deprive the secured
party of his pre-petition perfected security interest.' ..... Although
Marepcon was able to claim second generation proceeds only be-
cause Bumper Sales used the first generation proceeds, the Bumper
Sales court reached a result that is consistent with the model.' The
new inventory was replacement collateral for the original inventory.
Marepcon's security interest in the pre-petition inventory therefore
should extend to the after-acquired inventory.
In applying the liquidation model to inventory, there is a seman-
tic confusion that can arise in interpreting the phrase "replace or
substitute for." It does not mean generic categories of collateral,
such as "inventory," but rather specific items of collateral, such as the
underlying goods. Thus, in the discussion in Part II.A, although the
diamond tennis bracelets constituted inventory that, in a broad sense,
replaced and substituted for the pre-petition inventory of plastic
rings, the bracelets did not replace or substitute for the rings for pur-
poses of the liquidation model. The model is applied by looking
solely to the underlying property rights.93
Another issue arises where the inventory is not sold but leased
post-petition.94 Do the lease payments replace or substitute for the
189. IL
190. See Ud at 1439.
191. Id. (quoting CLARK, supra note 48, at 6.6[3]).
192. Marepcon should have petitioned the court to order Bumper Sales to give it ade-
quate protection in the form of second generation proceeds for the use of the first
generation proceeds. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1994); see also id § 361 (defining adequate
protection); supra notes 100-35 and accompanying text (discussing fairness evaluations of
the liquidation model).
193. Professor Lynn LoPucki suggested to the author a second example: The debtor
owns a beat-up 1985 Chevy van worth $5,000 which it uses for making deliveries. After
filing bankruptcy, the debtor sells that van and purchases a new Chevy van for $20,000
which it uses for the same purpose. The money for the new van comes from general
revenues of the business. In common usage, the new van "replaces" the old one and
"substitutes" for it. But to allow the secured creditor to have the new van as collateral is
unfair to the unsecured creditors. The liquidation model would not permit that result
because the underlying property rights in the new van, except perhaps to the extent of the
$5,000 received for the old van if used as part of the new van's purchase price, substitute
only for the general revenues of the business.
194. See U.C.C. § 9-109(4) (1995) (providing that goods are inventory under the UCC
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inventory?19 A lease is merely a sale of a portion of the inventory,
with the lessor having the right to take back the unsold portion
(called the residual value) at the end of the lease term.'96 Lease pay-
ments are the equivalent of the purchase price of, and therefore
substitute for, the portion of the inventory sold; they therefore would
be subject to the floating lien. The lien also continues in the inven-
tory returned at the end of the lease term, because it is pre-petition
collateral." 7
3. Contract Rights
When creditors are secured by rights in pre-petition contracts,'98
courts usually have extended the security interests to the payments
and other after-acquired collateral that the contracts generate in
bankruptcy. ' However, they have given very little explanation for
"if they are held by a person who holds them for sale or lease").
195. Compare infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text (discussing equipment
leases), with infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text (discussing hotel revenues).
196. For a discussion of the right to sell portions of an asset, see U.C.C. § 2-105(3), (4)
(1995) (permitting sales of part interests in goods and undivided interests in fungible
goods); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater Than the Whole: How Securitization
of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets
to Middle-Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 139, 149-51 [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Divisible Interests] (discussing sales of portions of intangible assets).
197. Even if the cumulative post-petition rent payments and residual value exceed the
amount that the inventory could have been sold for outright, the floating lien should con-
tinue. A secured party is entitled to market appreciation of collateral, and choosing to
lease rather than sell the inventory is simply a strategy to maximize its value. See Dews-
nup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,417 (1992).
198. Whether or not security interests in contract proceeds will survive bankruptcy,
the fact that the debtor may, subject to restrictions, choose to reject executory contracts
that are not advantageous to the bankruptcy estate can place certain limitations on the
value of these contracts in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994); see also J. Catton
Farms, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 779 F.2d 1242, 1247 (7th Cir. 1985) ("It is true
that the bankruptcy judge can ... allow a debtor to disaffirm an executory contract ....
But that was not done here. The bank was lucky that it was not done."). It is assumed
that certain contracts will not be disaffirmed because the debtor expects they will have
value even after the secured party's debt is paid in full.
199. For a case allowing perfected security interests in the proceeds of contracts and
agreements not mentioned in the text of this Article, see Carlson v. W.J. Menefee Constr.
Corp. (In re Grassridge Indus.), 78 B.R. 978, 981 (Bankr. W.D. Miss. 1987) (holding that a
creditor's security interest in the proceeds of a construction contract survived the filing of
the bankruptcy petition); see also . Catton Farms, 779 F.2d at 1247 (holding that bank
had a security interest in proceeds of a PIK contract under which the Department of Ag-
riculture paid farm not to grow corn).
Bankruptcy courts have allowed creditors with security interests in contracts to claim
the proceeds of oral agreements. See James Cable Partners L.P. v. Citibank (In re James
Cable Partners, L.P.), 141 B.R. 772, 776-77 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1992) (allowing creditor
that had a security interest in debtor's contract rights to claim the post-petition proceeds
of oral cable subscription agreements that existed pre-petition); Nanuet Nat'l Bank v.
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their decisions. Because a long term licensing agreement is very dif-
ferent from a contract to make a single shipment of goods, there is no
assurance that future decisions will be uniform. The courts therefore
need to articulate a test that applies to all types of contracts.
Before attempting to articulate a test, it is useful to examine
some representative cases. In J. Catton Farms, Inc. v. First National
Bank of Chicago,2 a bank loaned J. Catton Farms, a large farming
operation, $6 million secured by the operation's "'receivables, ac-
counts, inventory, equipment and fixtures and the proceeds and
products thereof.' "201 The loan agreement specified that
"receivables" included" 'all accounts, contract rights including, with-
out limitation, all rights under installment sales contracts[,] ... and
general intangibles ... in which the debtor has or hereafter acquires
any right.' "" The farming operation signed a payment-in-kind
("PIK") contractm with the Department of Agriculture in March
1983. The contract provided that if J. Catton Farms refrained from
planting certain crops during the growing season, the federal gov-
ernment would pay it the value of the unplanted crops. In April
1983, J. Catton Farms filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Code.
Having refrained from planting the crops specified in the PIK con-
tract, it became entitled to receive the value of the unplanted crops
from the Department of Agriculture in June 1983. The bank claimed
that it had a security interest in the proceeds of the PIK contract.
The court held that a security interest in the proceeds of contracts
made before bankruptcy can survive bankruptcy. It reasoned that
"liens in proceeds.., are said to pass through bankruptcy unaf-
fected."" 5
Another leading § 552 contract case is United Virginia Bank v.
Photo Promotional Assocs. (In re Photo Promotion Assocs.), 61 B.R. 936, 939 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that security interest in debtor's contracts extended to the pro-
ceeds of pre-petition oral agreements to process film).
200. 779 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1985).
201. Id. at 1244 (quoting loan agreement).
202. Id. (quoting loan agreement).
203. For cases and commentary dealing with the proceeds of PIK contracts, see In re
Schmaling, 783 F.2d 680, 682-83 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that security interest in "corn
and all other crops grown or growing" did not extend to proceeds of a PIK contract); In re
Sunberg, 729 F.2d 561,562 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that pre-petition security agreement in
contract rights extended to proceeds of PIK contract under § 552(b)); see also Kunkel,
supra note 153, at 330-32; Paul B. Rasor & James B. Wadley, The Secured Farm Credi-
tor's Interest in Federal Price Supports: Policies and Priorities, 73 KY. L.J. 595, 651-57
(1985).
204. See J. Catton Farms, 779 F.2d at 1247.
205. Id- Enforcement would be subject, of course, to the automatic stay under 11
U.S.C. § 362.
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Slab Fork Coal Co. 6 Slab Fork contracted to sell coal to Armco at a
price advantageous to Slab Fork. After Slab Fork filed its bank-
ruptcy petition, it shut down mining operations but, to preserve its
profitable coal supply agreement, it contracted to purchase coal from
Maben Coal Company for resale to Armco. United Virginia Bank,
one of Slab Fork's creditors, had a pre-petition security interest in
Slab Fork's contracts, including the coal supply contract with Armco.
Slab Fork claimed that § 552(a) cut off United Virginia Bank's inter-
est in the contract proceeds.m In response, United Virginia Bank
filed a motion to prohibit Slab Fork's use of the contract proceeds
minus the payment of Maben Coal's expenses.0' The court held that
under § 552(b) the post-petition contract proceeds were subject to
the pre-petition security interest."9 It reasoned that "[n]o change in
the right to payment under the Armco contract was brought about by
the filing of a bankruptcy petition, where the underlying asset and all
proceeds therefrom were subject to a valid pre-petition security in-
terest., 210  Certainly, "[ilt is true that coal had to be supplied to
Armco by or for Slab Fork before any right to payment arose, but
that is true for all the payments under the contract, whether gener-
ated pre-petition or post-petition.,
21
1
Although the outcomes of these cases will be shown to be consis-
tent with the liquidation model, the courts need to articulate a
rationale. This is particularly important when structuring commercial
and financial transactions12 because investors in those transactions
often depend on future-arising financial assets, such as rights coming
due under contracts, to generate cash for repayment.2 3 If there is un-
certainty whether the investors will be entitled to those rights, the
transactions may not be viable.2 4 Under the liquidation model, a
court should first ask whether the new, post-petition assets replace or
substitute for a portion of the contracts. In Slab Fork Coal and J.
Catton Farms, the contracts at issue were clearly liquidating collat-
eral. Each contract represented a finite bundle of rights. When each
206. 784 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Tarkenton, supra note 153, passim
(discussing Slab Fork Coal).
207. See Slab Fork Coal, 784 F.2d at 1189.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 1190.
210. Id at 1191.
211. Id.
212. See supra note 5.




of the contracting parties performed part of the agreement, each
earned a right to payment. The receipt of payment extinguished that
right so the value of the contract decreased as it generated payments.
Because the payments replaced, or substituted for, a portion of the
contracts, they should be subject to the pre-petition security interest.
In contrast to the contracts at issue in Slab Fork Coal and J.
Catton Farms, some contracts may confer indefinite rights. Suppose
HiTech developed a special metal finishing process that prevents
rust. It grants Steel Mill a license to use the process so long as Steel
Mill pays an agreed royalty. If HiTech files a bankruptcy petition,
should a floating lien on the licensing agreement extend to the ongo-
ing royalty payments? Under the model, a court should first ask
whether Steel Mill's royalty payments replace or substitute for a por-
tion of the licensing agreement. The answer is not immediately
obvious because one cannot ex ante quantify the amounts. One
might argue that the royalty payments do not replace or substitute
for the licensing agreement. The fallacy of such an argument, how-
ever, is its incorrect assumption that rights must be quantified in
advance. Even if one cannot quantify in advance the aggregate
amount of royalty payments that will be made over the life of the
contract, so long as that amount is finite 5 each payment made will
reduce, pro tanto, the aggregate."6 Seen from this perspective, the
individual royalty payments plainly substitute for a portion of the
contract, and therefore should be subject to the floating lien.
Can a model based on Chapter 7 assume that a liquidating
debtor will continue to perform the contract in order to generate
payments thereunder? The answer is that a debtor may continue in
limited operation, even in a Chapter 7 liquidation, in order to pre-
serve the value of an asset of the estate. The assumption that a
debtor may continue performing a valuable contract in order to
maximize the estate is therefore not inconsistent with a liquidation
215. However, pre-petition collateral that generates a stream of payments with no
definable duration would be non-liquidating collateral if the value of the payments does
not plainly correlate to the reduction in collateral value. See supra text accompanying
notes 41-45. The payments therefore would be non-replacement collateral. See supra
notes 75-92 and accompanying text. A possible example of this type of collateral is the
public stock of a blue-chip company, expected to continuously generate dividends. See
supra notes 160-79 and accompanying text.
216. It is, of course, a bit of an oversimplification to say that payment of one of a series
of payments reduces pro tanto the aggregate. Each payment might be seen as reinforcing
the market value of the remaining payments by reinforcing expectations; that does not,
however, change the essential conclusion of the text.
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model.217 This Article will show, however, that the debtor's cost of
continued performance should be subtracted from the payments gen-
erated post-petition under the contract.
28
The foregoing discussion of contracts focused on floating liens
on a debtor's pre-petition contracts. But what if the contract in ques-
tion is entered into post-petition? The inquiry then would be
whether that contract replaced or substituted, and therefore was re-
placement collateral, for other pre-petition collateral, or whether it
would be generated in the debtor's liquidation. A typical illustration
of that issue arises in post-petition leases of pre-petition collateral. 219
4. Equipment Leases and Equipment
Equipment leases are merely a specialized form of contract.
Most of the current case law construing the interaction of § 552 and
equipment leases is straightforward. Courts have consistently held
that a creditor's security interest in pre-petition leases extends to all
post-petition rentals paid under these leases m The liquidation
model would reach the same result. Lease contracts represent a fi-
nite bundle of rights and therefore constitute liquidating collateral.
As each rental payment is received, the value of the lease diminishes.
Thus, bankruptcy courts should extend pre-petition security interests
in leases to the post-petition rentals.
A more interesting question arises, however, when the floating
lien covers pre-petition equipment that is leased post-petition. Is the
post-petition lease subject to the floating lien? Under existing law,
rentals of pre-petition property are covered by a floating lien.21 Un-
217. As discussed supra at text accompanying note 78, 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1994) permits
such limited operation. Technically, however, § 721 refers to the operation of the busi-
ness "for a limited period." This suggests a possible limitation on the model. In some
contracts the amount of future payments expected may be so large compared to the debt
secured by the floating lien that allowing the lien to encumber all such payments would
violate the so called "smell test." In those cases, a court may well cut off the floating lien
on payments that are clearly unnecessary to repay the debt. Cf. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 1, § 3-27 (discussing the amount of the equity cushion that a secured creditor is enti-
tled to as adequate protection of its lien); Schwarcz, Divisible Interests, supra note 196, at
155 n.45 (suggesting that, irrespective of theory, a purchase price may be so low com-
pared to the amount of the payment stream to which the buyer can look for repayment
that the transaction would violate the "smell test" and be considered a secured loan
rather than a true sale).
218. This provides a conceptual underpinning for the "equities" exception in § 552(b).
See infra notes 249-85 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Lease-A-Fleet, Inc. v. University Cadillac, Inc. (In re Lease-A-Fleet,
Inc.), 152 B.R. 431,436-37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
221. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
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der the model, one first must ask whether the lease replaces or substi-
tutes for the equipment. That question already has been addressed in
analyzing post-petition leases of inventory.m A lease of an asset is
merely the sale of a portion of the asset, with the lessor having the
right to take back the unsold portion (the residual value) at the end
of the lease term.2m Because rent payments are replacement collat-
eral for the portion of the equipment sold, rentals also would be
subject to the floating lien under the model.
5. Hotel Revenues
Congress recently amended the § 552(b) exception to include se-
curity interests in hotel revenues.m Specifically, the amendment
states that security interests in "rents of [pre-petition property], ...
222. See supra notes 180-97 and accompanying text.
223. See id. This analysis is equally applicable to licenses or any other third party use
of a tangible asset for pay.
224. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 214, 108 Stat. 4106,4126.
For comprehensive articles describing the case law before the enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994, see Averch, supra note 153, at 486-87 (arguing that
bankruptcy courts should treat hotels differently from other income-producing real prop-
erty and that hotel revenues are proceeds within the meaning of § 552(b)); Freyermuth,
supra note 153, at 1465-66 (arguing that monies paid by commercial occupants are pro-
ceeds of the commercial real estate development and should be protected in bankruptcy
under § 552(b)). Before Congress mooted the debate, the weight of authority followed
the Ninth Circuit case Greyhound Real Estate Finance Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors
Comm. (In re Northview Corp.), 130 B.R. 543, 547 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
hotel revenues are newly created accounts, rather than proceeds, under Article 9). See
also Casco N. Bank v. Green Corp. (In re Green Corp.), 154 B.R. 819, 825 (Bankr. D. Me.
1993) (holding that income from room rental was not "rents," "profits" or "proceeds"
under the Bankruptcy Code); In re General Assoc. Investors Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R.
756,762 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993) (same); In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, 133 B.R. 850,
854-55 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (holding that hotel revenues are neither profits nor pro-
ceeds within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C.); In re Shore Haven
Motor Inn, Inc., 124 B.R. 617, 618 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that revenues from the
operation of a hotel are personalty, not rent); In re Majestic Motel Assocs., 131 B.R. 523,
526 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991) (holding that since hotel revenues are derived largely from
labor and services, they are not rents or profits derived from real property); Kearney
Hotel Partners v. Richardson (In re Kearney Hotel Partners), 92 B.R. 95, 103-04 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that security interest in revenues from hotel operations is a secu-
rity interest in personalty, not realty); In re Ashkenazy Enters., Inc., 94 B.R. 645, 646-47
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that a creditor's lien on hotel's operating revenues was
not a lien in rent). Under this reasoning, § 552(a) cuts off security interests in hotel reve-
nues. However, some cases held that hotel revenues constituted proceeds, profits,
products, rents or offspring within the meaning of § 552(b). See S.F. Drake Hotel Assocs.
v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re S.F. Drake Hotel Assocs.), 147 B.R. 538,539 (N.D. Cal.
1992). Specifically, courts found that hotel receipts were profits, see Mid City Hotel As-
socs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Mid-City Hotel Assocs.), 114 B.R. 634, 641-42
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1990), or rents, see T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership v. Financial Sec.
Assurance, Inc., 10 F.3d 1099,1105 (5th Cir. 1993).
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or the fees, charges, accounts, or other payments for the use or occu-
pancy of rooms and other public facilities in hotels, motels, or other
lodging properties" continue in bankruptcy.2m The amendment, how-
ever, may have gone too far in subjecting post-petition assets to a
pre-petition security interest.
Under the liquidation model, the first inquiry is whether the
post-petition rents or other payments replace or substitute for the
pre-petition collateral. When creditors take a floating lien only on
hotel room rentals, the post-petition rents do not substitute for the
pre-petition rents. The pre-petition rents generate cash proceeds in
the form of rental payments. And the cash, not the future rentals,
substitutes for the pre-petition rentals. ' But if a creditor is secured
pre-petition by the hotel building, and not merely by its rentals, the
floating lien should extend to rental payments made after the debtor
files the bankruptcy petition." The analysis would be the same as for
post-petition rentals of inventory or equipment.m Just as with rentals
of inventory or equipment, the lease of a hotel room can be viewed as
a sale of a portion of the hotel, limited in the case of a hotel not only
by time (the occupancy period) but also by space (the room). The
lease payment is the equivalent of the purchase price of, and there-
fore replaces, the portion of the hotel room sold, and therefore would
be subject to the floating lien.
The amended § 552, however, is ambiguous as to whether it
would extend floating liens on hotel room rentals to post-petition
rentals regardless of whether the creditor is secured by the hotel
building or merely by the rentals. It is unclear from the statutory
language whether the phrase "fees, charges, accounts, or other pay-
ments for the use or occupancy of rooms ... in hotels ... ," in which a
post-petition security interest is specifically recognized, modifies the
pre-petition security interest or only modifies the pre-petition prop-
erty already subject to a security interest. If courts uphold an
interpretation that a pre-petition security interest in payments for the
225. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, § 214, 108 Stat. at 4126.
226. The same argument would apply to a security interest in accounts receivable,
which applies to all accounts in existence as of the date of bankruptcy and to subsequently
received proceeds of such accounts. Such a pre-petition security interest would not, how-
ever, apply to accounts merely generated by the sale of goods or provision of services by
the bankrupt debtor.
227. Although allowing parties to use contractual terms to obtain different substantive
rights in bankruptcy may appear somewhat arbitrary, it is no different than the basic con-
cept of recognizing contractually agreed to security interests in bankruptcy. Third parties
are not misled, because financing statements notify them of the arrangement.
228. See supra notes 180-97,220-23 and accompanying text.
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use or occupancy of hotel rooms continues post-petition, then
§ 552(b) would be inconsistent both with existing law and the liquida-
tion model. For example, if a creditor makes a loan to a cruise line
and encumbers its existing and future cabin revenues, the floating
lien would not encumber post-petition cabin rentals. Courts are
likely to find that the security interest in the cabin revenues is merely
a floating lien79 on the cruise line's accounts and use § 552(a) to cut
off the lien.
6. "All Assets" of a Business
Particularly in loans to small or medium size businesses, a se-
cured creditor's floating lien may cover all of the debtor's existing
and future assets. The language of § 552(b) suggests that all of the
debtor's post-petition assets would then be encumbered because such
assets are "proceeds, product, offspring or profits" of the pre-petition
business?"' That result, however, would deprive debtors of any real
opportunity for a fresh start.' Using the liquidation model to ana-
lyze this problem, one first would ask whether the debtor's post-
petition assets replace or substitute for the pre-petition business.
This, however, is a tricky question for an ongoing business. A "going
concern" business represents more than just the sum of its assets.'
229. No pun intended!
230. Section 552(b) states that a pre-petition security interest extends to post-petition
"proceeds, product, offspring or profits" of "property of the debtor acquired before the
commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994). There is, however,
uncertainty under present law whether only the first generation of derivative assets
should be protected under § 552(b). See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, § 6-78, at 416:
Suppose that a bank has a perfected security interest in the debtor's crops and
all receivables and intangibles of the debtor, present and after acquired. The
debtor files bankruptcy in 1990 after having planted that year's crop. Under lo-
cal law and § 552(b), the bank's security interest will extend to any and all
proceeds of the 1990 crop .... It does not matter that the proceeds are paid
post-petition or even that the contracts or other arrangements for acquiring the
proceeds were made post-petition .... The bank's security interest will not ex-
tend to the debtor's 1991 crop or any of its proceeds unless § 552(b) protects
mediate proceeds and the bank can make the necessary, difficult proof.
For a discussion of second generation proceeds of inventory, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 180-97.
231. In theory, if the value of a debtor's pre- and post-petition assets significantly ex-
ceeds the amount of secured debt, the debtor might obtain partial relief from the floating
lien. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text. The "equities" exception in § 552(b)
also could give the debtor a chance to limit the floating lien, although its use would create
significant uncertainty in the law. See infra notes 249-85 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and
the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738,782-87 (1988) (arguing
that management of a debtor creates the extra value of a "going concern" above the value
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Therefore, the "asset" represented by the ongoing business is not
necessarily the same as the sum of the debtor's individual assets. 21
Because the model is based on a liquidation and not a going concern
theory, the appropriate application of the model would be to view the
debtor as merely an aggregate of individual liquidating assets.
One therefore should apply the "replacement or substitution"
test of the model by inquiring with respect to each item of pre-
petition collateral whether that item is liquidating collateral. Post-
petition assets that replace or substitute for liquidating collateral
would be replacement collateral and therefore subject to the floating
lien according to the methodology previously applied under the
model to various types of collateral.? 4 On the other hand, to the ex-
tent post-petition assets are non-replacement collateral, the inquiry
under the model turns to whether those assets would be acquired de-
spite the debtor's liquidation. Again, that would be an item by item
inquiry using the methodology previously developed under the model
for different asset categories.'
In summary, because the "asset" represented by a going concern
business is fundamentally different than the sum of the individual
assets used in the business, and the model is based on a liquidation
theory, one would apply the model to the debtor's individual assets
according to the methodology previously developed in this Article.
That preserves the balance between creditors' rights and debtor re-
habilitation.
7. True Sales
A true sale is a sale of accounts or other intangibles that legally
separates the future payment stream from the estate of the selling
company. 6 True sales are growing in importance as the central ele-
ment of a type of financing variously known as structured finance or
of the debtor's specific assets); cf. David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely
Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 88-89 (1991) (arguing that
Baird and Jackson's argument "may suffice when management is not fungible, but it fails
if management is easily replaced").
233. Cf. supra notes 160-79 and accompanying text (discussing stock dividends).
234. See supra notes 160-229 and accompanying text. Single asset real estate bank-
ruptcies are functionally unique because there is only one asset, and therefore the
liquidation model should be applied to that asset as a single item of pre-petition collat-
eral.
235. See supra notes 160-229 and accompanying text.
236. This legal separation is important because it means that the buyer owns the ac-
counts even if the seller later files for bankruptcy. See Steven L. Schwarcz, "Octagon




asset securitization. 3 In a structured financing, the selling company
(the originator) generally transfers its right, title, and interest in the
payment stream to a special purpose vehicle ("SPV"). 8 The SPV
issues capital market securities whose proceeds are used to purchase
the payment stream, and investors buy the securities based on their
assessment of the value of the payment stream.
Does § 552 cut off a pre-petition sale of the right to post-petition
payments? Although bankruptcy courts have not yet addressed the
question of whether § 552 applies to true sales, the language of the
statute suggests that it does not. Section 552 governs only security
agreements, which the Code defines as an "agreement that creates or
provides for a security interest." 9 According to the Code, a security
interest is a "lien created by a [security] agreement. ' '24* Thus, on its
face, § 552 cuts off floating liens but does not cut off ongoing sales.
Some might argue, nonetheless, that § 552 cuts off pre-petition
sales of future receivables that arise post-petition because, under the
UCC, a security interest "includes any interest of a buyer of accounts
or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9.''241 Article 9 applies "to
any sale of accounts or chattel paper."242 The UCC official uniform
commentary explains that "sales of accounts ... are brought within
this Article to avoid difficult problems of distinguishing between
transactions intended for security and those not so intended"2 3 be-
cause "[c]ommercial financing on the basis of accounts ... is often so
conducted that the distinction between a security transfer and a sale
is blurred."2' However, this argument would be fallacious for the
same reason that the Tenth Circuit's decision in the much criticized
237. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 25, at 141; Schwarcz, Divisible Interests,
supra note 196, at 143-45.
Structured finance, which is sometimes called securitization, is "becoming one of the
dominant means of capital formation in the United States." Investment Company Act
Release No. 19,105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,062, at 83,500
(Nov. 19, 1992) (provided in connection with the issuance of Rule 3a-7 under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940). It is expected to continue to grow in importance as a source
of capital. See, e.g., You Can Securitize Virtually Everything, Bus. WK., July 20, 1992, at
78. For an introduction to the subject of structured finance, see generally STEVEN L.
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SE-
CURITIZATION (2d ed. 1993).
238. See Schwarcz, Divisible Interests, supra note 196, at 143-44.
239. 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1994).
240. Id. § 101(51).
241. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1995) (emphasis added).
242. Id. § 9-102(1)(b).
243. Id. § 9-102 cmt.
244. Id. cmt. 2.
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case of Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmei 45 was fallacious: the in-
clusion of the sale of accounts within Article 9 is solely for purposes
of perfection and priority, and should not address substantive rights
in bankruptcy." Furthermore, the point of a true sale is to have a
transaction in which there is a recognizable distinction between a se-
curity transfer and a sale. Section 552 therefore should not cover true
sales. Nonetheless, property generated by the debtor post-petition is
theoretically property of the debtor's estate for an instant. Thus,
§ 362,247 the Code's automatic stay provision, may condition its ongo-
ing sale on judicial lifting of the stay.24
8. Milk from a Cow
The reader may finally ask, so what about milk from a cow-
does the liquidation model solve that riddle? Well, it does. The milk
does not replace or substitute for the cow because the value of milk
produced in any given period would not plainly correlate to the re-
duction in the cow's value during that period. Nonetheless, a court is
likely to conclude that a debtor owning a cow would continue, even
in liquidation, to milk the cow pending its sale, and therefore the milk
is an asset that would arise in the debtor's Chapter 7 liquidation. Ac-
cordingly, under the liquidation model, the milk would appear to be
subject to the floating lien.
C. Equities Exception
The equities exception in § 552(b) compounds the uncertainty of
§ 552 interpretation."4' This exception, read literally, appears to give
245. 995 F.2d 948, 954-55 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that accounts cannot be sold be-
cause the UCC treats their transfer as a security interest for perfection and priority
purposes).
246. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
COMMENTARY NO. 14 (1994).
247. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
248. The discussion supra notes 236-47 and accompanying text assumes, of course, that
the sale of future assets is valid under applicable state law. It should be cautioned that
the common law governing the sale of intangibles is ambiguous as to the effectiveness of
the sale of an intangible asset that does not exist on the date of its purported sale. Com-
pare New York Sec. & Trust Co. v. Saratoga Gas & Elec. Light Co., 53 N.E. 758, 760
(N.Y. 1899) (holding that purchaser of accounts must ensure that the subject matter of
accounts involves a right existing at the time of assignment in order to protect its interest
from general creditors), with Rockmore v. Lehman, 128 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.), rev'd on reh'g,
129 F.2d 892, 893 (2d Cir. 1942) (holding that assignment of account which arose from
contract already in existence was a legal assignment with priority over prior or subse-
quent equitable claims and over subsequent lien creditors in a court of law). Accord
Schwarcz, Divisible Interests, supra note 196, at 149 n.36.
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994). For a general discussion of the equities exception,
[Vol. 75
FLOATING LIENS
bankruptcy courts broad discretion to invalidate security interests
that otherwise survive the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Accord-
ing to the statute, a security interest that properly extends to
"proceeds, product, offspring or profits" within the meaning of
§ 552(b) is valid in bankruptcy "except to any extent that the court,
after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, or-
ders otherwise." The liquidation model of this Article, however,
significantly reduces the need for an equities exception under
§ 552(b). Because the post-petition application of the floating lien is
more focused under the model, there is less room for judicial discre-
tion. Nonetheless, the debtor may incur costs even in liquidation in
order to generate post-petition collateral. These costs include col-
lecting and reducing to money the property of the estate, and
operating the business of the debtor for a limited period, in each case
in order to maximize collateral and estate value."' The following dis-
cussion addresses how the debtor should be compensated for these
costs. The discussion also serves as an analysis of the existing equities
exception under § 552(b), whether or not the liquidation model is
adopted.
The legislative history suggests that the purpose of the equities
exception is actually very limited. Congress seems to have intended
it to cover situations where the "estate acquires the proceeds to the
prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims."" The legisla-
tive history explains that "[t]he exception is to cover the situation
where raw materials, for example, are converted into inventory, or
inventory into accounts, at some expense to the estate, thus depleting
the fund available for general unsecured creditors."' '  The problem,
however, is that if Congress wanted so to limit the equities exception,
see Nancy L. Sanborn, Note, Avoidance Recoveries in Bankruptcy: For the Benefit of the
Estate or the Secured Creditor?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1376,1390-92 (1990).
250. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (emphasis added).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
252. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 377 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6333;
see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 91 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,5877 (using
substantially the same language as the House Report).
253. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 377 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6333; see
also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 91 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5877 (using substan-
tially the same language as the House Report); see also 124 CONG. REc. 34,000 (1978)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("[T]he provision allows the court to consider the equities
in each case. In the course of such consideration the court may evaluate any expenditures
by the estate relating to proceeds and any related improvement in position of the secured
party."); id. at 32,400 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (making similar statement); S.
REP. No. 95-989, at 91 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5877 (stating that the
exception may be used when expenditures to acquire the proceeds "resulted in an im-
provement in the position of the secured party").
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why didn't it explicitly state the limitation in the statute?
1. Current Case Law
Given the disparity between the broad statutory language and
the more narrow legislative history, it is not surprising that courts
construing the equities exception have rendered widely varying in-
terpretations.' A number of bankruptcy courts, following an
ambiguous dictum in the Fourth Circuit's opinion in United Virginia
Bank v. Slab Fork Coal Co.,25 have suggested that the equities excep-
tion may be used to invalidate security interests that would otherwise
be valid under § 552(b), simply in order to promote the debtor's fresh
start:
As evidenced by the final clause in § 552(b), a bankruptcy
court may choose not to apply a pre-petition security inter-
est to post-petition proceeds "based on the equities of the
case." It appears clear from the legislative history related to
§ 552 that Congress undertook in that section to find an ap-
propriate balance between the rights of secured creditors
and the rehabilitative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
The latitude afforded to the bankruptcy court seems to this
court to indicate that such a balancing of interests was in-
tended in the framing of § 552. 6
Other courts, however, have limited the equities exception to
"expenditures of time, labor, and funds relating to the collateral ...
and the overall rehabilitative theme of bankruptcy law." 7  These
courts have considered whether recognizing the secured creditor's
interest in proceeds, profits, products, or offspring would constitute
an improvement in the creditor's overall position." If, for example
the secured creditor is "oversecured," then these courts might invoke
the equities exception to reduce the collateral cushion in order to fa-
cilitate the debtor's fresh start.
254. Even the very same court has rendered diametrically opposed characterizations
of the equities exception. Compare In re Lawrence, 41 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1984) ("The general rule of Section 552(a) is subject to a very narrow exception de-
scribed in Section 552(b).") (emphasis added), with In re Jackels, 55 B.R. 67, 68 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1985) ("While § 552(a) essentially terminates security interests as a general rule,
there is a very large exception found in § 552(b).") (emphasis added).
255. 784 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1986).
256. Id. at 1191. The author is not, however, aware of any case that imposes such a
draconian result.
257. Lawrence, 41 B.R. at 38; see also In re Vanas, 50 B.R. 988, 997 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1985) (approving Lawrence); In re Serbus, 48 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984)
(same).
258. See Vanas, 50 B.R. at 997; Lawrence, 41 B.R. at 38.
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Several courts have held that the equities exception should only
be invoked in cases where the trustee or debtor-in-possession has
used assets from the bankruptcy estate to create post-petition collat-
eral to the detriment of unsecured creditors.' 9 Judge Posner, writing
for the Seventh Circuit, explained this approach to the equities ex-
ception:
Suppose a creditor had a security interest in raw materials
worth $1 million, and the debtor invested $100,000 to turn
those raw materials into a finished product which he then
sold for $1.5 million. The proceeds of this sale (after de-
ducting wages and other administrative expenses) would be
added to the secured creditor's collateral unless the court
decided that it would be inequitable to do so-as well it
might be, since the general creditors were in effect respon-
sible for much or all of the increase in the value of the
proceeds over the original collateral.
The Fifth Circuit's gloss on the equities exception holds that un-
less a secured creditor has increased its collateral to the detriment of
unsecured creditors, the debtor-in-possession may not seek relief un-
der the equities exception and, instead, if it wishes to use the
collateral, must petition for permission under § 363 of the Code."'
Most debtors-in-possession would like to avoid this route because
§ 363 requires that they provide adequate protection against loss be-
fore they use the collateral.262
259. See, e.g., J. Catton Farms, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 779 F.2d 1242, 1246-
47 (7th Cir. 1985); Wolters Village, Ltd. v. Village Properties, Ltd. (In re Village Proper-
ties, Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441,444 (5th Cir. 1984).
260. . Catton Farms, 779 F.2d at 1247. For a case where the equities exception was
invoked because proceeds had been acquired to the detriment of general creditors, see
Nanuet Nat'l Bank v. Photo Promotional Assocs., Inc. (In re Photo Promotion Assocs.,
Inc.), 61 B.R. 936 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). But see In re Bohne, 57 B.R. 461 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1985) (holding that debtor is not allowed to offset against value of bank's interest
in cash collateral for expenses incurred in raising calves).
261. See Village Properties, 723 F.2d at 444. Secured creditors who attempted to use
the equities exception to improve their positions were soundly rebuffed by the First Cir-
cuit, which stated that the equities exception "is not a general grant of equitable power
permitting a court to correct a secured creditor's errors by recognizing a security interest
in non-proceeds." New Hampshire Bus. Dev. Corp. v. Cross Baking Co. (In re Cross
Baking Co.), 818 F.2d 1027, 1033 (1st Cir. 1987); see also In re Wynnewood House As-
socs., 121 B.R. 716, 727 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (refusing to apply the equities exception
when it would benefit secured but not unsecured creditors).
262. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1994); cf. supra note 14 (discussing need to supply ade-
quate protection when using cash proceeds from the sale of pre-petition inventory to
purchase new inventory).
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2. Proposed Change
The goal of affording debtors a fresh start is already implicit in
§ 552(a)'s cutoff of post-petition security and would be explicit under
the liquidation model. Therefore, broadening the equities exception
by appealing to the fresh start policy not only would, effectively,
double count the impact of that policy but also would unfairly privi-
lege the debtor's reorganization over secured creditor expectations.
There is, however, an appropriate middle ground that is consistent
both with the liquidation model and existing law and also with the
goal of preventing depletion of the estate to the detriment of unse-
cured creditors."3 Courts should invoke the equities exception only to
the extent that the debtor depletes the bankruptcy estate for the purpose
of generating after-acquired collateral.
By enhancing the debtor's ability to rehabilitate, the model pro-
vides a rationale for this middle ground. A secured creditor wants
the debtor to incur costs in order to generate the post-petition collat-
eral. Allowing the debtor to deduct these costs is necessary to
motivate the debtor to generate the collateral, hoping to realize sur-
plus collateral value once the secured creditor's debt is repaid.' 61 On
the other hand, the liquidation model already limits the secured
creditor's ability to deprive a reorganizing debtor of the fruits of its
ongoing profit-making activities. No longer is there a need for a
broad equities exception.
Creating such a bright line rule for the interpretation of the equi-
ties exception would inject predictability and certainty into § 552."
Security interests in property are recognized entitlements. The
scheme of the Code is to protect holders of collateral. The debtor,
for example, often must petition the court under § 36316 to use collat-
eral, and only may do so after providing adequate protection to the
creditor. 7 Allowing creditors to plan and bargain, knowing the pre-
263. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 252-53 (showing that the legislative history
regards the equities exception as covering the acquisition of post-petition collateral at the
expense of unsecured creditors).
264. Under U.C.C. §§ 9-502(2) and 9-504(2), "the secured party must account to the
debtor for any surplus [collateral value]." U.C.C. § 9-502(2) (1995). In some cases, there
may not be any surplus collateral value. A debtor that doubts the existence of a surplus
can choose not to, and may reject any contractual obligations that otherwise would re-
quire it to, generate the collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994); see also supra note 217
(discussing a limitation on the liquidation model); cf. supra note 69 (discussing debtor's
right to surplus as motivation to perform post-petition obligations).
265. Cf supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing clarity).
266. See 11 U.S.C. § 363.
267. See id. §§ 361,363.
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cise extent to which a court will protect their interests, promotes the
efficient functioning of the credit economy." s Reimbursing the bank-
ruptcy estate only for funds spent generating after-acquired collateral
also would make the Code internally consistent." Section 506(c) al-
ready provides that creditors that benefit from the preservation or
disposition of their collateral must reimburse the bankruptcy estate
for the necessary and reasonable costs of preserving or disposing of
the collateral.'
It is useful to compare this proposal with the well-known In re
Delbridge case. A Michigan bankruptcy court developed a novel ap-
proach to the interpretation of the equities exception, finding that "it
is unfair to let the creditor with a pre-petition lien on milk walk away
with the entire cash proceeds of milk produced largely as a result of
the farmer's post-petition time, labor, and inputs .... Section 552(b)
allows the court leeway to fashion an appropriate equitable rem-
edy., 21 The Delbridge court suggested that the debtor and creditor
were "joint venturers" and created a mathematical formula for the
division of the collateral proceeds, as if they were joint venture prof-
its.2n Delbridge therefore raises the question whether the debtor is
merely entitled to return of its costs (as this Article proposes) or is
also entitled to a share of the profits generated by its investment of
the costs. The discussion below examines that question using the
methodology introduced in Part II of this Article.2 3
From the standpoint of clarity, this Article's solution of return-
ing costs is preferable to the joint venture solution of Delbridge.
Even the bankruptcy court that derived the profit sharing formula in
268. See Union Say. Bank v. Augie Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie Restivo Baking
Co.), 860 F.2d 515,519 (2d Cir. 1988).
269. Cf. supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text (discussing the consistency of the
liquidation model with the Code).
270. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1994); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Peltz (In re Flagstaff
Foodservice Corp.), 762 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1985); National Bank of N. Am. v. Isaac Co-
hen Clothing Corp. (In re Isaac Cohen Clothing Corp.), 39 B.R. 199 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984). Given the existence of § 506(c), one may even question the need to retain an equi-
ties exception in § 552(b). It also should be noted that where the value of the collateral is
increased by less than the costs incurred by the estate, § 506(c) would limit the estate's
recovery to the benefit conferred to the secured party, whereas § 552(b) and the legisla-
tive history do not impose such a limit. This Article argues that such a limit should be
applicable to both sections. See infra note 281 and Annex A.
271. In re Delbridge, 61 B.R. 484, 490 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), affid on other
grounds sub nom. Delbridge v. Prod. Credit Ass'n. and Fed. Land Bank, 104 B.R. 824
(E.D. Mich. 1989).
272. See id.
273. See supra note 93.
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Delbridge may have misapplied it to the facts.274 Returning costs is
also preferable from the standpoint of simplicity of implementation
because the amount of costs expended by the debtor is usually prov-
able with little effort. 75 On the other hand, the joint venture solution
would require a hearing and testimony in order to determine the
profits to be split.276 This Article's solution is also at least as flexible
as the Delbridge approach: if the return of costs is insufficient to mo-
tivate the debtor to expend the costs in order to preserve or enhance
the collateral's surplus value (discussed below), the debtor and the
secured party can negotiate to find a mutually acceptable solution.
The solution may be a joint venture sharing as in Delbridge, but it is
not limited to that.
This Article's solution of returning costs also is consistent with
commercial law, which entitles the secured party to any increase in
collateral value whether or not such increase results from the
debtor's actions.'s Furthermore, it is consistent with bankruptcy law
generally." Section 506(c) of the Code, for example, allows a debtor
to recover only the reasonable and necessary costs of preserving or
disposing of collateral.279 A default rule should be consistent with the
statutes-in this case the UCC and the Code-under which it oper-
ates. In contrast, profit sharing on a joint venture basis between a
274. See Delbridge v. Production Credit Ass'n & Fed. Land Bank, 104 B.R. 824, 828
n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (observing that the lower court transposed the "20% cash collateral
figure, to which the debtors would be entitled" and the percentage of proceeds to which
the secured party would be entitled). Professors LoPucki and Warren also observe that
the Delbridge formula does not always produce rational results:
[The] application of Judge Spector's formula from Delbridge to this problem
produces interesting results. As we write, most hotels are appreciating in value,
making the "depreciation" a negative number. When the Delbridge formula is
applied to depreciating collateral, the amount that is cash collateral is also a
negative number. Presumably, that means that none of the room charges can
equitably be treated as cash collateral--certainly not the result that Congress
and secured credit lobbyists labored so hard to bring about!
LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 82, at 91.
275. In any event, because the amount of costs expended by the debtor is only one of
the variables included in the more complicated joint venture sharing formula, see In re
Delbridge, 61 B.R. at 490, it is always simpler to determine such costs than to compute the
entire formula.
276. See i at 491. The costs alone of conducting such a hearing may well outweigh
the benefits of a joint venture solution.
277. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(c) (1995). This is subject, of course, to the debtor's
right to surplus after the secured party is paid in full. See U.C.C. § 9-502(2) (1995).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 269-70.
279. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1994). Therefore, the Code already implicitly recognizes




debtor and secured party has no basis in commercial law or in the
Code's methodology or policy.
Perhaps the only argument in favor of the Delbridge approach is
fairness. That argument, however, may not withstand scrutiny. It
already has been noted that a debtor has no obligation to incur costs
to increase collateral value. The debtor would do so only if it bene-
fited from the increased value. The debtor, however, usually does
benefit from the increase because it is entitled under law to any sur-
plus collateral value once the secured party is paid on its claim.' For
example, the debtor invests $X to improve collateral previously
worth $Y. This Article proposes that the debtor be entitled to a re-
turn of the $X from the collateral proceeds, putting the debtor in no
worse a position than if it had not made the investment." Further-
more, if the investment increases the collateral value by more than
$X, the debtor would profit from the increase when the surplus is re-
turned.m If the debtor determines that the investment will not
increase collateral value sufficiently, or if the secured party is under-
secured so that the debtor may not realize surplus.' the debtor may
280. See U.C.C. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(4). The Delbridge court may have been misin-
formed on that critical point. The court appeared to think that the secured party was
entitled to the entire upside: "[I]t is unfair to let the creditor with a pre-petition lien on
milk walk away with the entire cash proceeds of milk produced largely as a result of the
farmer's post-petition time, labor, and inputs .... " In re Delbridge, 61 B.R. at 490.
281. However, to be consistent with § 506(c), and also to safeguard against a debtor's
inefficient spending, the debtor's entitlement should be limited to the extent of the bene-
fit to the secured party holding the floating lien. So if the debtor invests $X to improve
collateral previously worth $Y, but the improved collateral is only worth $Y + $112X, the
debtor would be entitled to a return of $1/2X and any eventual surplus value. See infra
Annex A.
282. In this context, it should be observed that commercial law also protects the value
of the debtor's surplus in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) provides that "every aspect" of
a foreclosure sale or other disposition of collateral, "including the method, manner, time,
place and terms must be commercially reasonable." U.C.C. § 9-506 allows a debtor to
redeem collateral prior to its disposition "by tendering fulfillment of all obligations se-
cured by the collateral" as well as the secured party's reasonable expenses. Furthermore,
the secured party cannot simply retain the collateral in satisfaction of its claim unless it
takes possession of the collateral after default and notifies the debtor of its proposal to so
retain the collateral, and the debtor fails to object. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1995).
283. A secured party is undersecured if the collateral value is less than the amount of
its loan. There is no surplus from an undersecured loan because the collateral is used up
repaying debt. The author's experience with major bankruptcy cases involving sophisti-
cated parties is that secured parties are rarely undersecured. Professor Lynn LoPucki,
however, observed to the author that secured parties in small bankruptcy cases often may
be undersecured. That at least would raise the question whether a different default rule
should apply in small bankruptcy cases in order to better motivate the debtor to protect
the collateral.
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decide against making the investment.m As discussed above, the se-
cured party then could negotiate to try to persuade the debtor to
make the investment. The resulting deal may reflect a profit sharing
similar to Delbridge but flexibility is preserved to bargain for any mu-
tually acceptable arrangement.2 It therefore is consistent with the
liquidation model, and the balance it brings between protecting se-
cured creditors' rights and a debtor's ability to rehabilitate, to limit
the equities exception of § 552(b) to reimbursing the debtor only for
the cost of generating post-petition collateral.
IV. CONCLUSION
The case law interpreting the federal bankruptcy cutoff of float-
ing liens is ad hoc and lacks a conceptual center, reflecting a failure of
existing law to distinguish two fundamentally different ways in which
post-petition collateral can arise. Sometimes, pre-petition collateral
changes form and is replaced by post-petition collateral. There is
general agreement that the replacement collateral should be covered
by a floating lien. Other times, however, post-petition collateral does
not replace or substitute for pre-petition collateral. Existing law then
has problems analyzing whether the non-replacement collateral
should be covered by a floating lien. By focusing on a causation test
of whether the non-replacement collateral constitutes "proceeds,
product, offspring, or profits" of pre-petition collateral, existing law
often becomes confused in semantics and ambiguities. As a result,
the outcomes can be unpredictable.
To analyze whether a floating lien should cover non-replacement
collateral, one must balance the bankruptcy policy favoring debtor
rehabilitation with a secured creditor's right to its contractual bargain
where rehabilitation is not impeded. This Article proposes that a liq-
uidation model can be used to achieve that balance. Furthermore,
284. One might intuitively think of the debtor's motivation to make an investment in
collateral by analogy to a shareholder's motivation to invest in a wholly-owned corpora-
tion. The debtor, like the corporate shareholder, is the residual claimant of the asset. If
the corporation is solvent, the shareholder then may well decide to protect its residual
value by investing more. That would be analogous to the typical case of a debtor pro-
tecting collateral. But if the corporation is insolvent, the residual is (and additional
investments may be) worthless; the shareholder then would have little motivation to
throw good money after bad. That would be analogous to a debtor deciding whether to
protect collateral where the secured party is undersecured.
285. The arguments in favor of returning costs are even more compelling in the con-
text of the liquidation model than under existing § 552(b). That is because the model
limits the circumstances under which a floating lien would apply, so the analogy is much




outcomes under the model are more certain than under the current
case law melange. Thus, capital is available to risky but worthwhile
ventures, and both creditors and debtors benefit from a more stable
credit economy. In addition, investors and rating agencies will be
able to better assess the risks of commercial and financial transac-
tions-such as asset securitizations-that depend on future-arising
assets for repayment.
The liquidation model also significantly reduces the need for an
equities exception under § 552(b). Because the post-petition applica-
tion of the floating lien is more focused under the model, there is less
room for judicial discretion. However, the debtor may incur costs
even in liquidation in order to generate post-petition collateral, and
therefore should be able to recover those costs to the extent of the
benefit to the holder of the floating lien.
Because the language of § 552 is broad, courts could choose to
apply the liquidation model without amending the existing statute. 2
That, however, still leaves in place statutory language that is ambigu-
ous on its face. It therefore would be preferable to refine the text of
§ 552. Annex A to this Article proposes statutory language to ac-
complish that.
Although the liquidation model is likely to encourage commer-
cial and financial transactions that rely on future cash flows from
financial assets,' this Article does not depend upon a claim that the
liquidation model will stimulate more overall business activity than
any competing approach. Business activity must be balanced with the
bankruptcy policy of debtor rehabilitation. Is the liquidation model
the highest valued balance of post-petition value to rehabilitating
debtors and pre-petition loss to secured creditors? Because the gain
and loss are to different parties and the likelihood of debtor rehabili-
tation is dependent on a multitude of factors, the answer may well be
unknowable. Some therefore may argue that the balance reached in
this Article is ultimately arbitrary, and that other balances could be
reached-some more pro-debtor, others more pro-creditor. That,
however, would miss the central point of this Article: A systematic,
predictable and consistent approach to reaching a balance is desir-
able. The liquidation model provides such an approach and opens a
dialogue on whether that approach is optimal.
286. A court could, for example, use the liquidation model to give meaning to the
phrase "proceeds, product, offspring, or profits" under § 552.
287. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
1997] 467
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ANNEX A
A Proposal to Amend Section 552 of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code (11 U.S.C. § 552)* to Implement the Liquidation Model
Section 552. Post-petition effect of security interest.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the
commencement of the case is not subject to any lien result-
ing from any security agreement entered into by the debtor
before the commencement of the case. [No change.]
(b) Except as provided in sections 363, 522, 544, 545, 547,
and 548 of this title, if the debtor and an entity entered into
a security agreement before the commencement of the case
and if the security interest created by such security agree-
ment extends to after-acquired property of the debtor, then
such security interest extends to such property of the debtor
acquired after the commencement of the case to the extent
provided by such security agreement and by applicable non-
bankruptcy law, but limited to the extent such after-
acquired property (i) replaces or substitutes for the pre-
petition collateral, or (ii) would be acquired by the estate
even if the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title.
(c) The trustee may recover from post-petition collateral
otherwise permitted under this section the reasonable and
necessary costs and expenses, in addition to those referred
to in section 506(c), of generating such collateral to the ex-
tent of any benefit to the entity secured by such collateral.
Section 549 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 549, dealing with post-




Illustrative Differences in Outcomes Between Existing Law and
the Liquidation Model
Note to Reader: This Annex summarizes the differences in out-
comes discussed in the Article and is subject to the Article's more
complete description.
* Dividends. Existing law is ambiguous as to whether a float-
ing lien covers stock dividends. The liquidation model
covers most dividends.
* Inventory. Probably no difference other than the "equities"
exception discussed below, except the liquidation model
clarifies that a floating lien covers second generation pro-
ceeds.
* Contracts. The few cases decided under existing law have
given very little explanation for their outcomes. The liquida-
tion model provides a rationale for the outcomes.
* Equipment Leases and Equipment. No difference other than
the equities exception.
" Hotel Revenues. Existing law appears to recognize a floating
lien on hotel room rentals even if the creditor is not secured
by the hotel building. The liquidation model does not.
" All Assets of a Company. Existing law may recognize a
floating lien on all post-petition assets of the company. The
liquidation model views the company as merely an aggregate
of individual liquidating assets, so the floating lien does not
attach to post-petition "going concern" value.
" Milk from a Cow. Existing case law is divided as to whether
a floating lien on post-petition milk should be recognized in
bankruptcy. The liquidation model would recognize such a
lien.
" Equities Exception. This qualifies all of the above categories.
Under existing law, a judge has discretion, "based on the eq-
uities of the case," to cut off a floating lien that is otherwise
specifically allowed. The liquidation model, by more clearly
defining what a floating lien covers, would reduce this discre-
tion and allow a judge only to cut off the reasonable and
necessary costs and expenses of generating the collateral.
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ANNEX C
Index to Significant Concepts
This Annex refers the reader to portions of the Article that explain
significant concepts.
Explanation of the liquidation model, and its two step test.
Introduction, at 411-14; Part I.C, at 423-25.
* Application of the liquidation model. Part III.B.1, at 443-45.
* Distinction between the existing legal standard of "proceeds,
product, offspring or profits" and the liquidation model.
Part I.C, at 423-25.
• Distinction between tracing and the liquidation model. Part
I.C, at 422-25.
* Assumptions and qualifications underlying the liquidation
model. Introduction, at 412-14.
• Application of the liquidation model to collateral leased
post-petition. Part II.B.2, at 447-48; Part III.B.4, at 452-53.
• Application of the "equities" exception to the liquidation
model. Part llI.C.2, at 462-66.
* Definition of "liquidating collateral." Part I.C, at 422.
* Definition of "non-liquidating collateral." Part I.C, at 422.
Compare Part III.B.1, at 444-45.
• Definition of "replacement collateral." Part I.C, at 422.
* Definition of "non-replacement collateral." Part I.C, at 422.
Compare Part III.B.1, at 444-45.
• Does the liquidation model apply to generic categories, or
specific items, of collateral? Part III.B.2, at 447.
* How to determine what collateral would be acquired by a
debtor in a liquidation. Part III.B.1, at 444-45.
* Operation of the debtor in a liquidation. Part I.C, at 420-21.
* Simplified assumption as to the period of a debtor's liquida-
tion. Part III.B.1, at 445.
* Distinction between the liquidation model and a valuation
test. Part I.B, at 419 n.72; Part II.D, at 439.
* Relationship between the liquidation model and collateral
depreciation. Introduction, at 412-13.
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